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ABSTRACT
Child undernutrition is a serious issue in Nepal as 36% of children below five 
years of age are chronically undernourished. Reducing child undernutrition is an 
important priority to prevent adverse effects through the life course that perpetuate the 
cycle of undernutrition and poverty.  
Women’s intra-household bargaining power is an important determinant of child 
nutrition. Intra-household bargaining power is an individual’s relative social and 
economic position within the household to access and control resources, and influence 
decision-making. In our research, we use women’s intra-household bargaining power as a 
resource for care, which enables women to be exposed to nutrition information, gain 
knowledge, access economic and social opportunities to improve food security, and 
positively influence child nutrition. While there is evidence on the positive association 
between women’s bargaining power and child nutrition, research gaps exist in 
understanding the mechanisms through which this relationship is linked and the role of 
men’s intra-household bargaining power in children nutrition.  
We conducted a cross-sectional analysis of the baseline data from 2012 of the 
multisectoral program, Suaahara, in rural Nepal. We measured intra-household 
bargaining power based on four domains: 1) ownership and control of assets, 2) social 
participation, 3) workload, and 4) household decision-making control. In the first 
manuscript, we examined the relationship between women’s bargaining power and infant 
and young child feeding (IYCF) practices in children aged 0-23 months, and tested if 
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exposure to IYCF messages mediated this relationship. Exposure to IYCF information 
mediated the relationship between social participation and early initiation of 
breastfeeding and dietary diversity. Household decision-making control had a direct, 
positive relationship with exclusive breastfeeding.  
In the second manuscript, we examined the relationship between bargaining 
power of women and men with child height-for-age z-score (HAZ) in children aged 0-59 
months, and tested if household food insecurity mediated this relationship. Women’s 
ownership and control of assets was positively associated with higher HAZ and food 
insecurity partially mediated this relationship. Men’s social participation was directly 
associated with higher HAZ and indirectly associated through food insecurity.  
We found that different domains of women’s and men’s bargaining power relate 
to child feeding and child nutritional status. Our study attempts to address the research 
gaps by providing empirical evidence on men’s role in child nutrition and examining 
potential mechanisms that may be targeted for nutrition programming and policy. 
Strategies engaging men and women may prove effective for nutrition-specific and 
nutrition-sensitive interventions.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite a significant decline in the past two decades, the burden of child 
undernutrition in Nepal is still high with 36% of the children below 5 years of age being 
categorized as stunted.1,2 The first thousand days of a child’s life starting in-utero through 
the first two years is a critical period for immediate and long-term growth and 
development.3 Efforts to reduce child undernutrition are important because the adverse 
effects of stunting span across the life course in early childhood development, schooling 
outcomes, adult health and nutrition, birth outcomes, productivity, and income and 
wages.4–6   
Interventions to reduce child undernutrition increasingly employ nutrition-specific 
and nutrition-sensitive strategies to address the underlying sociocultural and economic 
issues that affect health behaviors, access to health and nutrition resources, and food 
security, which ultimately affect child nutritional status.7 One important area for 
nutrition-sensitive interventions is the improvement of women’s status within the 
household and the community.8,9  
Women’s household status, as explained by intra-household bargaining power, 
and henceforth interchangeably used as bargaining power, is the relative social and 
economic position of a woman within a household for accessing and controlling
resources, and her decision-making control. In our research, women’s bargaining power 
refers to a mother’s bargaining power. Women can leverage their bargaining power to 
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access socioeconomic and health opportunities and influence decisions for self and 
family. Our research is guided by the Care for Nutrition conceptual framework by Engle 
et al. (1999)10 where we use bargaining power as a resource for care. For the mother of a 
young child, having high bargaining power can enable access to health information and 
knowledge, social capital, and economic means, which can promote and improve 
individual health behaviors, caring practices, and affect household-level determinants 
such as household food security to positively influence child nutritional status.10,11  
In South Asia, women’s bargaining power is gendered due to the social context 
and cultural norms where men and women within a household are likely to have 
differential say in decision-making and control of resources.12 There is evidence of a 
significant, positive relationship between women’s bargaining power and child nutritional 
status, but more research is needed to understand 1) the relationship between women’s 
bargaining power and child feeding practices, 2) the relationship between men’s 
bargaining power and child nutritional status, and 3) the mechanisms through which 
women’s and men’s bargaining power relates to child feeding practices and nutritional 
status. 
It is important to understand the relationship between child feeding practices and 
bargaining power because improving infant and young child feeding (IYCF) practices is 
critical to improving child nutritional status. A primary focus on improving behaviors 
that support good child nutrition involve increasing knowledge and awareness to result in 
behavior change for improved IYCF practices.13 Following appropriate IYCF practices 
requires social, economic, knowledge, and human resources, which are more likely to be 
accessed and used if women have high bargaining power. Research on IYCF 
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determinants thus far mainly shows that sociodemographic factors such as mother’s 
education, urban or rural setting, geographic location, and access to health services are 
associated with IYCF practices.14–16  
Understanding men’s bargaining power in relation to child undernutrition is 
critical as men’s role is shown to be associated with other health-related factors such as 
access to knowledge resources and health-seeking behavior,17–19 which can affect child 
nutritional status.  Research exploring men’s role in child nutrition has primarily focused 
on paternal education or income. There is limited evidence on the relationship between 
men’s household bargaining power and child nutritional status.20,21  
Our research is focused on understanding the relationship of gendered intra-
household bargaining and child nutrition by examining the mechanism linking this 
relationship. Understanding the mechanisms increases the scientific plausibility of the 
observed relationship between women’s bargaining power and child nutrition. 
Understanding intra-household bargaining for women and men in the household and the 
extent of their ability to make economic, social, and health decisions for improved child 
nutrition is important to design targeted and effective interventions to improve child 
nutritional status.  
We used baseline data collected in 2012 from the first phase of Suaahara, a 
multisectoral nutrition intervention project in Nepal. We created measures and indicators 
of access to and control of resources and household decision-making of women and men.  
We produced two manuscripts resulting from this research. In the first manuscript, we 
analyzed the relationship between women’s bargaining power and four World Health 
Organization (WHO)-recommended IYCF practices: 1) early initiation of breastfeeding, 
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2) exclusive breastfeeding, 3) minimum meal frequency, and 4) dietary diversity in 
children 0-23 months. We also examined if exposure to IYCF information mediated the 
relationship between women’s bargaining power and IYCF practices.  
 In the second manuscript, we analyzed the relationship between women’s and 
men’s bargaining power, and child nutritional status. We examined women’s and men’s 
decision-making control to describe the gender dynamics within the household. We also 
studied the association of women’s and men’s bargaining power with child nutritional 
status and tested household food insecurity as a mediator of this relationship.  
1.1 Goals and Outcomes of Dissertation Research 
The overall objective of this research is to understand the role of gendered intra-
household bargaining on IYCF practices and child nutritional status, and identify specific 
paths connecting intra-household bargaining power and child nutrition. By studying 
men’s and women’s bargaining power, this research contributes to the emerging literature 
on men’s role in child nutrition, which is still considerably understudied. This research 
will also contribute to the broader field of determinants of child nutrition and women’s 
empowerment by 1) assessing how men’s and women’s bargaining power relates to child 
nutrition by identifying specific domains of bargaining that are significant and 2) 
understanding distinct mechanisms through which bargaining power relates to IYCF 
practices and child nutritional status.  
1.2 Specific Aims 
1. To understand the relationship between women’s intra-household bargaining power 
and IYCF practices in children aged 0-23 months 
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1.1. To examine the relationship between women’s intra-household bargaining power 
with four WHO-recommended IYCF practices (early initiation, exclusive 
breastfeeding, minimum meal frequency, and diet diversity). 
1.2. To examine if exposure to IYCF information mediates the relationship between 
women’s bargaining power and IYCF practices 
2. To understand the relationship between women’s and men’s intra-household 
bargaining power with child nutritional status in children aged 0-59 months 
2.1. To describe men’s and women’s household decision-making control.  
2.2. To examine the relationship between intra-household bargaining power of 
women and men with child nutritional status 
2.3. To test if household food insecurity mediates the relationship between women’s 
and men’s bargaining power and child nutritional status 
1.3 Prior Studies on Women’s Bargaining Power 
 The baseline data from Suaahara has been used to assess the relationship of 
women’s empowerment in agriculture with maternal and child nutritional status in two 
studies. Women’s empowerment in agriculture index was used for the following 
domains: 1) autonomy in agricultural production; 2) access and control of resources 
including household assets, agricultural assets, and credit decision-making; 3) control 
over use of income; 4) leadership as indicated by active group membership and public 
speaking; and 5) workload and leisure time. In one of the studies, the aggregate measure 
of women’s empowerment in agriculture was associated greater maternal body mass 
index and maternal dietary diversity.22 Active group participation was associated with 
greater maternal dietary diversity, while control over income and reduced workload was 
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associated with higher maternal BMI. Women’s control over income was associated with 
higher height-for-age z-score (HAZ) and dietary diversity in children 0-59 months.   
 The second study examined the relationship between women’s empowerment in 
agriculture and nutritional status in children 0-23 months.23 Overall empowerment in 
agriculture and three of its domains, namely autonomy in production, control over 
income, and leisure time were positively associated with length-for-age z-score (LAZ).  
The current research expands on the prior Suaahara-based studies to understand 
the household dynamics and its relationship with child nutrition by 1) understanding the 
relationship between multiple domains of intra-household bargaining power and multiple 
IYCF practices, 2) examining individual level (exposure of IYCF information) and 
household level (food insecurity) mechanisms to understand how bargaining power 
operates to affect IYCF and child nutritional status, respectively, and 3) understanding 
the role of men’s bargaining power and the relationship with child nutrition, which thus 
far has not been studied. 
In the following chapters, I first review the relevant literature around child 
nutrition and bargaining power. Second, I describe the methods followed in conducting 
this research. Third, I present two manuscripts that address the two specific aims of this 
research. Lastly, I summarize the findings of this research and discuss the contribution to 
literature and implications for future research, programs, and policies.  
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
 Presented in this chapter is the background literature on child nutrition and intra-
household bargaining power. I provide an overview of child nutrition and feeding 
practices in Nepal. I then summarize the literature on the role of women in child nutrition 
to highlight the importance of understanding maternal determinants of child nutrition. 
Intra-household bargaining power is defined and related literature is summarized, 
specifically focusing on the different domains of bargaining power and how each domain 
relates to child feeding practices and/or nutritional status. Lastly, as our research also 
focuses on men’s role in child nutrition, relevant literature is described on this topic.  
2.1 Child Nutrition in Nepal 
2.1.1 Overview of Child Nutritional Status in Nepal 
Child undernutrition is a serious issue in Nepal despite the significant gains in 
reduction of undernutrition made in recent years.2,24 According to the most recent 
Demographic and Health Survey, 2016 report, 36% of children below five years were 
stunted (chronic undernutrition), 10% were wasted (acute undernutrition), and 27% were 
underweight.1 The 2015 Millennium Development Goal for Nepal for a reduction in child 
stunting to 30% was not met.25 Child undernutrition, especially in the first two years of 
life contributes to larger maternal and child health issues such as child mortality, maternal 
mortality due to the intergenerational cycle of undernutrition, and affects socioeconomic
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issues such as education and income generation.4,26,27 Child undernutrition is a result of 
multiple socioeconomic and cultural factors.10,11 Understanding and addressing the 
determinants of child undernutrition is an important priority for programs and policy.  
2.1.2 Infant and Young Child Feeding Practices in Nepal 
 Child nutritional status is greatly determined by feeding practices in the early 
childhood period.13,28 Infant and young child feeding encompasses several breastfeeding 
and complementary feeding (breast milk plus semi-solid and solid foods) practices. Some 
of the key WHO-recommended practices in the first 24 months of life include early 
initiation of breastfeeding, i.e., putting a child to breast within an hour of birth; exclusive 
breastfeeding for six months; age-appropriate introduction of complementary feeding; 
consuming meals a minimum number of times in a day, known as the minimum meal 
frequency; and having a diverse diet to meet the macronutrient and micronutrient 
requirements, known as the dietary diversity.29 According to the 2016 Nepal 
Demographic and Health Survey, the prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding for the first 
six months of life was 66% and early initiation was 55%. The prevalence of minimum 
diet diversity among children aged 6-23 months was only 35%.1 
 Following appropriate IYCF practices helps not only in providing adequate 
nutrition, but only promotes general child health and development, and reduces the 
incidence of common childhood illness. For example, exclusive breastfeeding is 
associated with reduced incidence of common childhood illnesses such as diarrhea and 
acute respiratory tract infections, which contribute to child undernutrition.30,31 Similarly, 
exclusive breastfeeding is associated with early gross motor and cognitive development. 
32,33  
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Worldwide statistics on growth faltering suggest that LAZ, which measures long-
term nutritional status sharply declines from 3 months to 24 months.34 Appropriate 
introduction of complementary feeding through adequate quantity and quality of semi-
solid and solid foods in addition to breast milk is required for the growing infant beyond 
six months to meet the increasing and diverse nutrient requirement. Dietary diversity, a 
measure of complementary feeding quality, has consistently shown a significant 
relationship with child nutritional status, especially with HAZ and prevalence of 
stunting.35 Interventions targeting improved complementary feeding have also shown to 
be effective not only in improving IYCF practices but also child growth.36,37 
2.1.3 Window of Opportunity for Improved Child Nutrition 
The coincidence of the sensitive phase of rapid growth and development in 
children and period of child feeding practices in the first two years of life highlights the 
importance of addressing child undernutrition in the first 1000 days of life. Public health 
practitioners and researchers have called for increased promotion of IYCF practices as an 
important strategy to combat child undernutrition in developing countries.13,38–40 Current 
public health strategies have moved toward more integrated approaches to reduce 
undernutrition, and therefore understanding the sociocultural determinants of feeding 
practices and child nutrition is important for informing effective programs and policies.41  
2.2 Role of Women in Child Nutrition 
Determinants of child nutrition are varied, complex, and often interact with one 
another. The UNICEF conceptual framework (1990) for child undernutrition explains the 
basic, intermediate, and proximal factors leading to child undernutrition.42 These factors 
affect an individual’s health and nutrition within the social, economic, and political 
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context, which provide the necessary resources for women to facilitate for better nutrition 
and care practices that support optimal child nutrition, growth, and development. Engle 
and colleagues (1999) presented a modified UNICEF conceptual framework known as 
the Care for Nutrition conceptual framework to elaborate the concept of care for child 
health and nutrition. They defined care practices as “the practices of caregivers that affect 
nutrient intake, health, and the cognitive and psychosocial development of the child”(pp. 
1310).10 They further elaborated on the resources needed for caregivers to optimally care 
for children such as education, health and nutrition status, knowledge and beliefs, 
autonomy and control of resources within the household, workload, social support from 
family members and community. These caregiver characteristics are influenced by 
broader economic, social, and political contexts. Women’s position in a household and 
her ability to leverage that position can increase her access to and control of resources 
that could positively impact child nutrition outcomes.  
Gender is an important social determinant that intersects with the broader 
economic and social context, and with several proximal factors affecting undernutrition 
such as food security, access to health care and information, and human capital.12,43,44 
Improved role of women in the household and community is shown to be associated with 
better maternal and child nutritional status.43,45,46 Below, I discuss how women’s role is 
tied to the basic and proximal determinants of child nutrition and then specifically discuss 
intra-household bargaining as a determinant of child nutrition.  
2.2.1 Socioeconomic Context and Role of Women 
Poverty is one of the fundamental causes of child undernutrition. Economic 
growth is associated with improved child nutritional status. For example, one multi-
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country analysis showed that GDP growth of 5.5% annually, predicted a 1% reduction in 
prevalence of stunting per year, translating into a large cumulative effect over years.47 
Women’s education and employment is shown to contribute to national growth in 
developing countries. For example, a regional analysis of across Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America showed that gender inequality in education directly affects economic growth 
and also has an indirect effect through reduced human capital.48 Another study in India 
found that female education in terms of enrollment rates in school and average rate of 
education significantly contributed to economic growth.49  
Household economy and assets are also strongly associated with better child 
nutritional outcomes.2 Gender norms within the broader social context define women’s 
role related to access and use of household economic resources.50 Research suggests that 
greater women’s economic control has a positive effect on household economy, income 
generation, and maternal and child nutrition.22,23,51,52  
Social context in a setting can create opportunities or constraints that affect child 
nutrition. Maternal education, as a resource for care, is an indicator of social development 
on broader scale and is shown to be associated with child nutrition. A multi-country study 
involving 85 countries found that higher national female literacy levels were significantly 
associated with reduction in childhood stunting.53 Maternal education also matters at the 
household level, and is one of the most basic and commonly included variables in child 
nutrition and public health studies. It is shown to have a strong, positive effect on child 
nutrition.47,54,55 One important mechanism through which maternal education affects child 
nutrition is better health knowledge and improved health care utilization. For example, a 
study in Bolivia to elucidate the pathways between maternal education and childhood 
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stunting found health-care utilization for essential care such as prenatal care, institutional 
delivery, receiving tetanus injection before birth, and using modern contraception 
significantly explained the effect of maternal education on child nutrition.56 Similarly, 
one study in Lesotho found that the nutrition knowledge mediated the relationship 
between maternal education and child wasting, with a greater effect among wealthier 
households.57 Maternal education is shown to improve women’s status, affect greater 
decision-making for self and children, and provide equitable health care for children.58 
Social construction of gender norms affects women’s status at home and outside 
the household. Patriarchal societies in South Asia have been shown to influence women’s 
access to economic and social resources, and decision-making control. For example, one 
review on women’s status in Asian countries noted several institutional forces including 
laws restricting female ownership of assets, prohibition from working outside, perception 
of male dominance, and inability of women to carry forward family name affected 
women’s status in the society and the household.59 Similarly, a study in India and 
Pakistan found household decision-making control, mobility, experience and protection 
from domestic violence, and control over economic resources was a result of gender 
stratification within the society that provided differential and unequal access to and 
control of resources for men and women.60 It was also noted that equal status for men and 
women, controlling for other socioeconomic indicators had a significant, positive effect 
on child nutritional status. 
2.2.3 Maternal Characteristics as Human-Capital for Child Nutrition   
 In general, maternal characteristics link the proximal and distal factors that affect 
child nutrition. The cyclic nature of maternal and child nutrition is strongly showcased in 
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several studies that examined the relationship between maternal health and child 
nutrition. For example, maternal height is consistently shown to be an important predictor 
of child nutritional status.4,61,62 A six-country study found the prevalence of child stunting 
at two years was significantly more in shorter mothers and those children were more 
likely to be shorter in adulthood.63 Maternal anemia is a common health issue in 
developing countries and associated with anemia in children. For example, one study in 
Mexico estimated that maternal anemia was associated with a three-fold increased risk of 
low hemoglobin levels in infants.64 In Indonesia, normal birth weight infants with anemic 
mothers had 80% higher odds of being anemic, and low birth weight infants had more 
than three times the odds of being anemic at 3-5 months of age than mothers who were 
non-anemic.65 Anemia in children is detrimental to physical and cognitive development 
in their critical growth period, which can in turn hinder optimal growth and development 
during the critical first two years of life and beyond.3,66  
2.3 Overview of Intra-household Bargaining Power 
Sociocultural norms in patriarchal societies such as in South Asia govern the role 
of men and women within a household. Low women’s status in such settings creates 
inequality in access to and control of resources, and their decision-making power.12 A 
way to understand the differential position between men and women in a household is 
through intra-household bargaining power. Intra-household bargaining is primarily an 
economic concept that describes a household as a collective where members may have 
preferences on household consumption or production, which can create conflicts.67–69 
Resolution of any conflict depends on the members of a household that have the power to 
negotiate or influence an outcome. Economists describe this (bargaining) power as the 
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“threat point”,67,69 which is an “individual’s social and economic position if the 
household were to breakdown” (pp 325).17 Intra-household bargaining refers to the 
relative social and economic position of individuals within a household for accessing and 
controlling resources and decision-making power.  
Intra-household bargaining can be a result of gendered social norms and 
institutional factors such as laws and policies, which may provide differential access to 
resources due to gender.68,70 In most settings in South Asia, gendered roles tilt intra-
household bargaining power in favor of men. This inequality creates and reinforces the 
differential position between men and women within a household and may affect child 
nutrition outcomes.  
While the concept of intra-household bargaining is economic in nature, its has 
sociocultural underpinnings that have commonality with the basic determinants of child 
undernutrition.10 In the current research, we examine the relationship between intra-
household bargaining power as indicated by access to and control of resources and 
decision-making power and child nutrition outcomes, to highlight the role of household 
gender dynamics in child nutrition.  
There are two main dimensions of intra-household bargaining: 1) access to and 
control of resources, and 2) decision-making control.12 Access to and control of resources 
and decision-making control usually have a reciprocal relationship where higher access to 
and control of resources can lead to more decision-making control and vice versa.67,71  
1. Access to and control of resources 
Intra-household bargaining power is an unobservable construct. Economists use 
proxy measures of access to and control of financial resources and education to study an 
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individual’s position in a household. In addition, time and social resources are also 
important to study when examining the relationship between intra-household bargaining 
and child nutrition as these factors can affect access to health resources, knowledge, and 
caregiving behaviors, which can influence child nutrition.  
Access to and control of mainly economic resources can increase an individual’s 
ability of bargaining in household matters and therefore, education, income, employment 
and ownership of assets are commonly used as proxy measures.71–73 Education can lead 
to more self-awareness, independent thinking, and informed decision-making, which is 
shown to be associated with greater decision-making power and improved maternal and 
child health nutrition outcomes.74,75 Women’s employment and control over income puts 
them in a better position to negotiate household decisions.67 Working outside the home 
can increase an individual’s social capacity for interactions, increase social capital, which 
can also influence household bargaining.67 Ownership of assets refers mainly to the 
access to financial resources, which not only provides a fall back option when needed to 
support the household but also improves decision-making power related to the asset as 
well as other household decisions. Studies have demonstrated a positive relationship 
between women’s ownership of assets and maternal and child health outcomes.71–73  
Time is a resource that is gendered, with unequal allocation for women and men. 
Women tend to have higher workload than men as a result of being involved in 
household chores, in caretaking for young children and elders, and contributing to 
household income or food production through employment, wages, or subsistence 
farming.76 There is leisure time inequality between men and women, which can increase 
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time constraints, adversely affect maternal well-being, and negatively impact child-care 
practices.77–79 
Like economic resources and time, social resources such as social capital can 
affect an individual’s decision-making and influence child nutrition outcomes. Social 
resources such as access to groups like microcredit groups, mothers’ group, agriculture 
groups can provide social capital which can lead to informational support, increase social 
awareness and social capital, and influence bargaining within the household.69,80  
2. Decision-making control 
Decision-making control is a part of bargaining power, where an individual can 
exert their influence to make household decisions.71,81 Greater decision-making control 
for women related to family issues, reproductive health, domestic violence, and mobility 
is associated with improved child nutrition outcomes.82,83 Indeed, the relationship 
between decision-making and access to resources such as education, income, 
employment is bi-directional because both factors are governed by social norms and 
while women with greater assets or resources would have more power to make decisions, 
better decision-making control could also lead to gaining access to education, having 
more say in income and employment activities, and owning more assets. 
Overall, evidence shows that higher access to and control of resources, and better 
decision-making control are associated with improved child nutritional status, but little is 
known about the relationship between intra-household bargaining power and infant 
feeding practices beyond the effect of women’s education or income. Intra-household 
bargaining power may affect important health and human resources required for 
improved caregiving (appropriate IYCF) practices and child nutrition outcomes.  
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The traditional roles of men and women produce differential intra-household 
bargaining, but less is known about how men’s role in intra-household bargaining is 
associated with child nutrition outcomes. Understanding these relationships will provide 
evidence for effective program interventions and policies to promote not only child 
nutrition but also women’s empowerment and maternal well-being.  
2.3.1 Intra-household Bargaining and Women’s Empowerment 
Empowerment is a process of increasing an individual’s ability to make choices 
that facilitate the individual to take necessary actions that lead to the desired outcome.84 
This process is specific to those who have thus far been deprived of the opportunity to 
make choices to bring about a change within their social, economic, and political 
context.85 Women’s empowerment can be explained as a process by which women 
redefine their roles within the household and community in a way that expands their 
abilities as decision-makers and agents of action for self and family where they 
previously faced restrictions.86 Women’s empowerment could be used as a measure of 
bargaining power over time.76 Similar measures about access to resources and decision-
making that constitute intra-household bargaining have been used to examine the effect 
of empowerment on several maternal and child health outcomes.82,83,87  
2.4 Intra-household Bargaining Power Domains and Child Nutrition 
The discussion thus far underscores the importance of understanding the role of 
women in child nutrition, examining specific paths, and devising interventions that 
consider women’s role in the household and the community. In our research we focus on 
four specific intra-household bargaining power domains: 1) ownership and control of 
assets, 2) social participation, 3) workload, and 4) household decision-making control. 
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Described below is a review of evidence detailing the relationship between four specific 
domains of bargaining power used in our research.   
2.4.1 Ownership and Control of Assets and Child Nutrition 
 Women with economic assets are more likely to have higher bargaining power, 
which can have a positive influence on child nutritional status. For example, based on a 
nationally representative sample, Allendorf (2007) found that women’s land ownership 
was positively associated with decision-making related to household economy, women’s 
mobility, and own health. Women’s land ownership also significantly reduced the odds of 
prevalence of stunting and underweight in children under five years of age.70  
 Women’s control over assets is also associated with other aspects of child well-
being, which may be related to child nutrition. Study on men’s and women’s economic 
assets and education found that woman’s assets and husband’s education were positively 
associated with expenditure on children’s education, while only husband’s assets was 
related to food expenditure in Bangladesh.88 Overall financial autonomy or equal say in 
household economic decision-making significantly affects child nutritional status, but the 
several indicators for it have shown to have differential effect. In a study on the effect of 
women’s financial autonomy and stunting in children under 36 months, in Andhra 
Pradesh, India, found that children of women who had the ability to set aside money for 
use as they choose had 23% lower odds of stunting than those who did not. The study 
however found no effect of decision-making related to purchase of large household items 
on stunting.89  
Another study in India of mother-child dyads in children 3-5 months found that 
mother’s financial autonomy increased odds of exclusive breastfeeding by 26% after 
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adjusting for confounding, but found no significant association with LAZ, weight-for-age 
z score (WAZ), or weight-for-height z score (WHZ).90 Women’s empowerment in 
agriculture, and specifically, women’s control over income was positively associated with 
child HAZ in Nepal.22 Overall, having more control of assets may result in women 
leveraging their bargaining power to access information and economic resources that can 
enable women to care more effectively for their children by improving feeding practices, 
improving diet quantity and quality, and ultimately improving child nutrition.   
2.4.2 Social Participation and Child Nutrition  
 Women’s social capital can have a positive effect of child health and nutrition.91 
Social participation increases access to social capital. Social capital is defined “as 
resources embedded in social structures which are accessed and/or mobilized in purpose 
actions” (pp35).92 Social capital can improve access to food and health resources, 
knowledge networks, improve economic and living conditions, improve psychological 
and emotional well-being, which together can help in self-efficacy for child care, 
increased food security, reduction in child illnesses, and improvement in child health, 
which ultimately leads to improved child nutritional status.80 Literature on the effects of 
social capital on child nutrition has broadly focused on two types of social capital: 1) 
structural social capital, which encompasses group membership and extent of 
participation, citizenship, and social network characteristics and 2) cognitive social 
capital, which is how an individual feels about trust, reciprocity, sharing, and support.80,93  
 A number of studies related to social capital have analyzed data from the Young 
Lives (YL) study in Andhra Pradesh, India, Vietnam, Peru, and Ethiopia. The YL study 
used a number of measures of structural and cognitive capital. One study focusing on 
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children aged 6-18 months found that high cognitive social capital was associated with 
improved LAZ and WAZ among children, but did not find community group 
membership to be associated with child nutritional status. Additionally, it found that 
involvement in citizenship activities was negatively associated with HAZ in India, but 
was positively associated in Vietnam.80 Another analysis of the same dataset found no 
association between any of the above-mentioned social capital measures with prevalence 
of stunting in children under one year of age in India.94 Another YL study examined the 
size of the network and network characteristics in the same sample in India and found 
that larger network size and a network with higher literacy level were significantly 
associated with higher LAZ.95 The study also found that mother’s network comprising of 
non-family members was negatively associated with LAZ. Recent studies in Nepal 
examining women’s empowerment in agriculture have analyzed the social domain based 
on active participation in group membership and found that group membership was 
related to maternal nutrition, but did not find any relationship with child nutrition in 
children under two years or children under five years.22,23  
Studies promoting social capital through group membership have also shown 
improvements in child feeding behaviors. In developing countries, interventions have 
incorporated social components such as mother-to-mother support groups, group prenatal 
services, i.e., increased structural social capital with an aim to increase knowledge and 
awareness of different practices and have noted some success for exclusive 
breastfeeding.96,97 For example, a group-based intervention with expectant mothers in 
Uttar Pradesh, India showed that recommended feeding practices immediately after birth 
including feeding colostrum, early initiation of breastfeeding, and exclusive breastfeeding 
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for the first week improved among those in the intervention group.98 An intervention 
combining health programming with self-help groups in India showed that women in the 
intervention group had significantly higher odds of feeding colostrum than the control 
group.99 Research is still need to test specific mechanisms through which group 
membership may influence behavior change and improve IYCF practices.    
2.4.3 Workload and Child Nutrition  
 Time as a resource for child nutrition is relatively understudied.82,100 Discussion 
about time allocation and workload is often studied as gendered time indicating the 
differential availability and use of time for engaging in different activities between men 
and women. Gendered time in low- and middle-income countries can be a result of 
several sociocultural factors including the traditional role of men and women in the 
society, related norms that perpetuate this distinction, household composition in terms of 
number and gender, environmental factors and agricultural seasons, farming patterns, 
availability and access to basic utilities, and health and social services.101 Women spend 
significantly more time than men in child care, with recent estimates for South Asian 
countries like India and Pakistan suggesting women spend ten times as much time on 
unpaid child care as men.78 
Related to gendered time is the concept of time poverty which is defined as “the 
lack of enough time for rest and leisure after accounting for the time that has to be spent 
working, whether in the labor market, doing domestic work, or performing other 
activities such as fetching water and wood” (pp.45).102 Women in developing countries, 
especially in rural areas bear the burden of being involved in productive activities for 
income as well as household chores leading to higher workload and limited time for rest 
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and leisure even during sensitive phases such as pregnancy.103,104 Increased domestic 
workload can also hinder employment for women. For example, the Demographic and 
Health Survey (2011) from Nepal revealed more workload at home as a reason for not 
working outside. Those with the least education have the most workload at home.105 
Time constraints and high workload can also lead to inadequate care for young children, 
who are often looked after by an older child or sibling in the family.78 Time constraints 
and inadequate child care can lead to insufficient time for appropriate IYCF practices.103 
While research on time allocation and child feeding in South Asia is limited, one 
qualitative study in Nepal to identify behavior change strategies for better IYCF practices 
found that mother’s paucity of time and labor work activities hindered exclusively 
breastfeeding.79 Two studies in Nepal examining women’s empowerment in agriculture 
also found that reduced workload as measured by total number of hours worked in a day 
was associated with maternal higher BMI and availability of leisure time for mothers was 
associated with higher LAZ in children under two years.22,23 Studies have also examined 
women’s work status, employment, and income as indicators for women’s workload. For 
example, in a study in India, mother’s current and previous employment was negatively 
associated with WAZ.106 Another study from a nationally representative data in India, 
however, found that children of working women had higher WAZ than non-working 
women. Variation in research findings related to time allocation or workload and child 
nutrition highlight complexity of this issue. On the one hand, working women can 
contribute to household income, which can positively affect nutrition status, while on the 
other hand, overburden and time constraints, especially with gender-specific roles, can 
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also likely result in inadequate care for the child and the mother, which can negatively 
impact feeding practices and child nutritional status.  
While there is some evidence of time and workload affecting child nutritional 
status, there is limited evidence examining the linking factors between workload and 
IYCF practices. Workload is likely to affect not only exclusive breastfeeding but also 
complementary feeding through time insufficiency for preparation of nutritionally diverse 
food or practicing responsive feeding, which is shown to be associated with better child 
nutritional status and early childhood development.107,108  
2.4.4 Decision-making Control 
Household decision-making on aspects related to health for self and child, family 
planning, and domestic violence are commonly studied indicators for empowerment or 
autonomy, and in general, have shown to have a positive relationship with child 
nutritional status.82,83 While there is some variation in the results in different settings, 
greater decision-making control is shown to be associated with better child nutrition.   
An analysis from a nationally representative sample in Nepal found that HAZ was 
significantly higher in children where mothers had a final say in sole or joint decision-
making about seeking health care for self.109 The study also found that difficulty in going 
alone to get medical care for self was associated with lower WHZ but found no 
association with HAZ. There was no association between getting permission to access 
care and HAZ, stunting, or WHZ. Overall, the study showed greater decision-making has 
a positive association with several child nutrition measures.  
In a study in India, Shroff et al. (2009) showed that with regards to mobility, not 
needing permission to go to the market was associated with significantly lower odds of 
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child stunting, but stunting was not associated with decision-making related to going and 
staying with parents or siblings and permission to visit friends and relatives.89 In another 
study in India, Shroff et al. (2011) found that autonomy in child-care decisions was 
associated with increased LAZ but did not have any effect on WAZ and WLZ.90 A study 
in Afghanistan showed that lack of maternal autonomy, as measured by needing 
permission to see a doctor for child health care and having the requirement to be 
accompanied by someone to see a doctor, was significantly associated with higher odds 
of stunting.110 Decision-making related to family planning was positively associated with 
WAZ in children 0-5 years in Pakistan.21 An analysis of factors influencing child 
nutrition in Southern India found that women’s position in the household and 
involvement in major household decisions was positively associated with WAZ; other 
empowerment variables such as mobility and control for food supply did not show any 
relationship with WAZ.106 
The evidence above suggests that disempowerment in this domain limits access to 
economic and health-care resources. Utilization of health services is shown to be related 
to IYCF practices,111,112 therefore, it is important to examine if bargaining power has an 
impact on IYCF practices. 
2.4.5 Food Security and Role of Women   
 Household food security is a proximal factor that affects child nutrition through 
food availability and diet diversity, and is shown to be associated with maternal factors 
such as education and her role within the household. 113,114 Diet quality is an important 
predictor of child nutritional status.35 Food security affects the quantity and quality of 
diet.115,116 Maternal education has a positive relationship with household food security 
 25 
and is shown to be independent of socioeconomic status or income. Women with higher 
education status make better decisions about equitable food allocation for children and 
better diet quality, which ensures consumption of essential micronutrients as well as 
macronutrients for optimal child growth and development.114,117 Women’s bargaining 
power can, therefore, affect household food security through women’s role in food 
production, procurement, allocation, and preparation.  
2.5 Men’s Intra-household Bargaining Power and Child Nutrition 
 While there is research on women’s access to and control of resources and 
decision-making control affecting child nutritional status, there is less information about 
men’s bargaining power and its effect on child nutrition. Most studies have examined 
men’s role in terms of father’s education as determinant or confounder for child 
nutritional status or health. Fathers with higher educational attainment are more likely to 
have economic resources that can help with uptake of health services, provision of food 
and other household necessities to improved child nutritional status. For example, 
analyses from large-scale nutrition surveillance data from Indonesia and Bangladesh 
revealed that father’s education significantly reduced the odds of stunting in children 
under five years and that paternal education was also associated with other nutritionally 
important practices such as vitamin A supplementation and use of iodized salt.20 Another 
study based on a household survey in Pakistan tried to elucidate pathways linking 
parental education and child health outcomes. It found that father’s education was 
positively associated with child immunization through father’s health knowledge.21 One 
study in rural Madhya Pradesh, India found that illiterate fathers had the highest odds of 
children being underweight, stunted, or wasted as compared to those with higher levels of 
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education. There was also a gradient-effect, where the odds of undernutrition were 
highest in the lowest levels of education.118  
Importance of father’s involvement in child nutrition and feeding practices is also 
evident through intervention studies and qualitative inquiry. Much of the research related 
to father’s involvement and influence on breastfeeding practices is from developed 
countries, which points to the emotional and informational support that women received 
from the child’s father.119 For example, a 2-month intervention with expectant fathers on 
the management of breastfeeding found that those in the intervention group were 
significantly more likely to have babies that were exclusively breastfed for six months 
than in the control group and the mothers were less likely to encounter problems such as 
perceived milk insufficiency.120 A qualitative study in the U.S. found that low-income 
mothers had positive attitudes and knowledge towards breastfeeding when they received 
encouragement from the baby’s father to breastfeed.121  
While information is available on father’s education and support, less evidence is 
available on gendered bargaining power as a potential determinant of child health and 
nutrition. No evidence is available on how gender dynamics and intra-household 
bargaining affects child nutritional status and feeding practices. As discussed earlier, 
social and cultural norms affect women’s position, expected roles, and women’s 
bargaining power in the household. These norms also influence decision-making and 
household bargaining between a man and a woman. Women are more likely to be 
involved in household care activities, while men are involved in income generation, work 
outside home, and are responsible for expenditure on household items. A qualitative 
study in Ghana highlighted that women’s lack of economic support or autonomy affected 
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health-seeking behavior for children with malaria.122 The results from this study also 
suggested that husbands had a final say about where the child should be taken to a clinic 
and often controlled the payment for the same. Less involvement of father or refusal to 
pay resulted in delayed care for the child. The study also found that in case of 
disagreement between husband and wife about the place and expense to seek care, 
usually, the father had the last say, which also led to delayed health-seeking behavior.122 
Another study in Ghana about intra-household decision-making about seeking care for 
yellow fever in children showed that in resource-poor settings fathers prioritized between 
spending for use of health services or investing in income generating aspects such as the 
purchase of agricultural productions.17 The sole decision regarding payment of health 
care rested on the father due to traditional roles of earning wages that is associated with 
men.  
  In general, spousal decision-making is shown to affect health-seeking behavior 
in other aspects such as family planning and reproductive health. Research aimed at 
understanding this has usually assessed men and women’s responses about who takes 
decisions, either solely or jointly. Considerable disagreement between spouses is noted 
on who takes household decisions. For example, in Bangladesh, couples’ reports on 
household decision-making suggested that when couples provided consistent information 
about their individual autonomy of decision-making about a particular aspect, it resulted 
in higher odds in seeking antenatal care, while discordant answers resulted in lower odds 
of care seeking during pregnancy.123 This likely indicates an imbalance in intra-
household bargaining or poor spousal communication and related decision-making.  
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Male autonomy may or may not result in male involvement in health-seeking 
activities. For example, in Nepal, a study on pregnant women seeking antenatal care 
showed that sole women’s decision-making in a number of household decisions resulted 
in low male involvement in antenatal care, while joint decision-making by men and 
women resulted in more male involvement.18 Another study in Nepal also found that 
agreement between spouses on who makes certain household decision was strongly 
associated with health care use related to ANC, institutional delivery, receiving tetanus 
toxoid for the pregnant woman, and child immunization as compared to spousal 
disagreement or women indicating sole decision-making power.19 
Overall evidence suggests that spousal communication, decision-making, and 
bargaining is related to health, but virtually no research exists on mechanisms of how 
decision-making control relates to child nutrition. With gendered roles in households, 
South Asian context of patriarchy, and documented low status of women, it is important 
to understand how men and women’s role and decision-making within the household 
affects child nutrition for effective nutrition-sensitive interventions.  
2.6 Conceptual Model 
Our research is guided by Care for Nutrition conceptual framework by Engle et al. 
(1999) that describes paths and linkages between basic, underlying, and immediate 
determinants of child nutrition, and specifically incorporates the concept of care and 
related caring practices which ultimately create an environment that can enable proper 
child growth and nutrition.10 One of the resources needed to care for child nutrition 
explained in the framework is women’s autonomy, which relates to access economic and 
social resources, workload and household decision-making control. In our research, we 
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use women’s bargaining power as a resource for care with specific domains that capture: 
1) ownership and control of assets, 2) social participation, 3) workload based on time 
allocation on productive activities, and 4) household decision-making control.  
We conceptualize bargaining power to influence individual-level and household-
level processes that ultimately influence feeding practices and child nutritional status, 
respectively. Intra-household bargaining as a resource for care can affect processes at an 
individual level for IYCF practices through the mother as the primary caretaker who 
provides food to the child through breastfeeding and complementary feeding. A mother’s 
bargaining power can, therefore, enable her to access different channels of 
communication and health resources to gain exposure to specific IYCF information 
thereby ultimately affecting IYCF practices.  
We also conceptualize that bargaining power can influence child nutrition at a 
household level by the way of household food security. Food security is dependent on 
different individuals in the household including the mother of the child and other male 
figures involved in income generation and/or agricultural productivity to contribute to 
household food provision, and food quality and quantity, which can ultimately affect 
child nutritional status.  
In our research, we examine two distinct paths through which bargaining may 
relate to infants and young children and preschool-aged children differently. We focus on 
the exposure to IYCF information as a mechanism that may relate to IYCF practices 
because they are critical in the first two years of life for optimal nutrition and there is a 
need for appropriate knowledge about IYCF practices to follow them effectively.8,124 In 
the second mechanism we examine child HAZ in children below five years. Lower HAZ 
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may reflect the cumulative disadvantage more in children under five years than children 
under two years. The path through food insecurity may also more distinctly relate to 
children older than two years due to their independence in feeding themselves and 
predominant reliance on family foods as opposed to baby-specific foods such as breast 
milk or other supplemental semi-solid foods. We examine men’s role in HAZ in this 
second path as men are more involved in household food procurement and therefore may 
more likely influence HAZ than IYCF practices. We acknowledge that the two paths 
studied in this research can likely converge at two possible points: 1) household food 
insecurity may influence child dietary diversity,115,125 but those relationships and effects 
may be more prominent in the older children, and 2) IYCF practices can relate to child 
nutritional status, but cannot be assessed in our research due to cross-sectional nature of 
our data.  
 In the first manuscript, we examine how women’s intra-household bargaining power 
relates to exposure to IYCF information, and how that, in turn, relates to IYCF practices. 
In the second manuscript, we examine the path from intra-household bargaining power to 
food insecurity leading to child nutritional status.   
2.7 Specific Aims 
1. To understand the relationship between women’s intra-household bargaining power 
and IYCF practices in children 0-23 months 
1.1 To examine the relationship between women’s intra-household bargaining power 
with four WHO-recommended IYCF practices (early initiation, exclusive 
breastfeeding, minimum meal frequency, and diet diversity). 
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Hypothesis: Women’s bargaining power will be positively associated with 
improved IYCF practices.  
1.2 To examine if access to IYCF information mediates the relationship between 
women’s bargaining power and IYCF practices 
Hypothesis: Higher bargaining power will be associated with greater exposure to 
IYCF information, which in turn will be associated with improved IYCF 
practices. 
2. To understand the relationship of women’s and men’s bargaining power with child 
nutritional status in children aged 0-59 months 
2.1 To describe household decision-making control agreement between women and 
men 
2.2 To examine the relationship between intra-household bargaining power of women 
and men with child nutritional status 
Hypothesis: Higher women’s bargaining power will be positively associated with 
child nutritional status as compared to men’s bargaining power. 
2.3 To test if household food insecurity mediates the relationship between women’s 
and men’s bargaining power and child nutritional status 
Hypothesis: Household food insecurity will mediate the relationship between 
women’s and men’s bargaining power and child nutritional status such that higher 
bargaining power for both will reduce household food insecurity which will be 
then be associated with better child nutritional status.  
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2.8 Significance 
Women’s intra-household bargaining is an important issue that can affect care 
through IYCF practices. This research contributes to the literature on social determinants 
of IYCF practices that has thus far mainly studied factors such as parental education, 
socioeconomic status, and access to health care. Our research, therefore, provides a 
nuanced understanding of how context-specific women’s intra-household bargaining in 
Nepal affects IYCF practices and offers an opportunity to understand if and how different 
bargaining domains may relate to the different feeding practices. This can provide 
valuable information to devise effective strategies to promote IYCF practices and reduce 
child undernutrition.  
 Understanding men’s role in child nutrition has been increasingly recognized as 
an important factor, but there is limited evidence on how men’s bargaining power may 
influence child nutrition. Due to the traditionally dominant role of men in South Asia, 
men not only affect household economy and resources, but also the status of the women 
in the household, both of which can influence child nutrition. Research related to men’s 
role is limited to educational attainment or income, while no research has been done on 
the men’s intra-household bargaining as compared women. Our research provides an 
understanding of gender dynamics related to household decision-making and economic 
resources and the relatively understudied social resources, and time allocation for men 
and women within households.  
 The aim of this research was also to understand specific mechanisms through 
which the association between bargaining power and child nutrition is likely to occur. 
One of the linking mechanisms tested in this research is exposure to IYCF practices. 
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Information about appropriate IYCF practices is critical in bringing about behavior 
change communication and provision of IYCF information is an important strategy of 
behavior change interventions. Bargaining power can improve knowledge by accessing 
and utilizing resources such as mass media communications, health care providers, and 
community health workers that can provide IYCF information.  
The other mechanism we test that links bargaining power and child nutritional 
status is food insecurity. Food security as a linking mechanism between intra-household 
bargaining and child nutritional status is not studied even if individual relationships 
between bargaining power, child nutrition, and food insecurity are examined. 
Understanding this linking mechanism provides us with an understanding of the specific 
bargaining domains that are significant to this relationship. Studying the food insecurity 
mechanism contributes to the overall scientific plausibility of the relationship between 
bargaining power and child nutrition, and suggests specific aspects of bargaining power 
that could be targeted through intervention strategies. Overall, this research is important 
because interdisciplinary interventions will benefit from the information to target 
multiple outcomes such as food security, IYCF practices, and child nutritional status. 
This is also the first study to examine the relationship between men’s intra-household 
bargaining and child nutritional status, which will help to understand household gender 
dynamics and the relationship with child nutrition, which has not been previously studied.  
Our research expands on bargaining power to include multiple domains of 
bargaining. Empowerment studies have mainly been limited to women’s household 
decision-making control and/ or education.  
 34 
Overall, the results from this study provide a greater understanding of the 
gendered perspective of different bargaining domains that affect child nutrition. Findings 
from this research can have potential implications for future research and nutrition 
program interventions.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODS AND DESIGN 
3.1 Overview 
This study used the baseline data collected in 2012 from the Suaahara project, a 
multi-sectoral, community-focused project aimed at improving health and nutrition of 
women and young children in Nepal. The overall goal of this research was to understand 
the relationship of gendered intra-household bargaining power with IYCF practices and 
child nutritional status, and identify specific pathways connecting bargaining power and 
child nutrition.  
3.2 Study Setting 
 Nepal is a landlocked country between India and China, with high burden of 
poverty and history of political tension. The hills, mountains, and terai (plains) are 
Nepal’s three agro-ecological zones. Child undernutrition is a major issue in Nepal, with 
36% of children under five years being chronically undernourished, despite its significant 
overall reduction in the past 20 years.2,126 Health and nutrition in women and children 
differ by geographical region and social institutions such as caste and religion. Rural 
populations disproportionately bear a high burden of maternal and child undernutrition.126  
 The data for the current research were from the baseline survey for Suaahara 
project, a multi-sectoral intervention program aimed at improving the health and nutrition 
status of women and children in Nepal by targeting health behavior, increasing access to 
quality health and nutrition resources, and improving coordination between government
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 and non-governmental stakeholders for nutrition promoting strategies. This project 
approach aligned with the Government of Nepal’s Multi-sectoral Nutrition Plan 2013-
2017.127 Suaahara was implemented in rural areas of 16 districts across Nepal (Figure 
3.1). 
 
Figure 3.1: Suaahara program districts 
 
Source: Cunningham et al., 2013 
3.3 Sample 
 The sample for Suaahara was acquired through multistage cluster sampling. For 
the first stage, 16 districts were selected across Nepal with intervention and control arms 
having eight districts each. Districts were matched for sociodemographic and agro-
ecological characteristics. Eighty Village Development Committees (VDCs) were 
selected using probability proportional to size for the second stage with five VDCs per 
district. For the third stage, three rural wards were selected from each VDC using 
probability proportional to size to get a total of 240 wards. For the last stage, within each 
ward, 17 households with children under five years were randomly selected to obtain a 
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Figure 2.1: Evaluation design 
 
 
 
We selected 16 districts:  8 intervention districts where Suaahara will implement programs (the 
“intervention” sample) and 8 matched comparison districts (Figure 2.2). In order to collect baseline data 
prior to initiation of Suaahara programming and to maximize the opportunity to see impact at endline as 
implementation will have occurred for the longest period, we selected phase 1 implementation districts as 
the 8 survey intervention districts. Aiming for comparison districts that were as similar as possible to the 
intervention districts, we selected 8 districts primarily on the following characteristics: agro-
ecology/topography, human development index ranking; size of land holdings, proportion of total 
population under two years of age, level of poverty, percent of population that is marginalized, and radio 
ownership. The district matching was accomplished in consultation with the Suaahara team, New Era, and 
other individuals and institutions affiliat d with Sua hara or working on health a d nutrition research in 
Nepal. In some cases, it was difficult to find a match on all of these indicators and therefore, the closest 
eight matching districts were selected (Table 2.1). The matching exercise was undertaken in consultation 
with a large number of stakeholders knowledgeable about Nepal and documentation of indicators from the 
Government of Nepal and development partners such as UNICEF. 
 
Figure 2.2: Survey districts 
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total sample of 4,080 households. Within each household, one child less than five years 
of age was randomly selected as the index child for the survey and if available, one child 
having the same biological mother was selected as the non-index child. The mother of the 
index child completed the household survey. A separate questionnaire was administered 
to the male household head, preferably the father of the index child when available, or 
other male member of the household who made major household decisions.127  
Table 3.1 Sample size based on specific aims and specific outcomes 
Specific  
Aims 
Age Group 
(months) 
Sample Size 
 
Applicable Nutrition Indicator 
1 0-5 384 Exclusive breastfeeding 
1 6-23 1402 Minimum diet diversity, minimum meal 
frequency WAZ 
1 0-23 1787 Early initiation 
2 0-59 2166a HAZ 
2 0-59 1052b HAZ 
 
Note: Actual sample slightly lower for different models based on data available on the four bargaining 
domains 
a Sample based on data available for women’s and men’s bargaining domains; includes all male 
respondents i.e. father of the index child (spouse of the mother) or another male decision-maker in the 
household 
b Sample based only on if male respondent is the father of the index child (spouse of the mother).  
 
 The sample for the current research differs according to the specific aims and is 
presented in Table 3.1. For aim 1, where the outcome is IYCF practices, the sample 
consisted of index children aged 0-23 months. Age range of the sample differed for 
specific IYCF practices as follows: 1) 0-5 months for exclusive breastfeeding, 2) 0-23 
months for early initiation, and 3) 6-23 months for minimum meal frequency and dietary 
diversity. For aim 2, the sample consisted of index children aged 0-59 months. For aims 
that have men’s intra-household bargaining as a variable, sample size was based on 
bargaining power information available for men and women.  
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3.4. Data Collection 
 Data for the Suaahara baseline survey were collected in 2012. Trained 
enumerators collected information on the household surveys. One interview was 
conducted with the mother of the index child and another interview was conducted either 
with the father of the index child or another male household decision-maker. Information 
from the mother was collected on child health and child care, infant and young child 
feeding practices, household food security, maternal diet diversity, women’s 
empowerment, information access, maternal health, IYCF knowledge, attitude, and 
perceptions, water sanitation and hygiene, child and maternal anthropometry, and 
hemoglobin measurement. Anthropometric measurements were age-appropriate where 
children aged 0-23 months were measured using supine length, while for children aged 
24-59 months, standing height was measured in duplicates by trained enumerators using 
standardized length boards (ShorrBoard produced by Weight and Measure LLC).127 
Interviews with male household decision-makers provided information on household 
composition, household economics, social assistance, male empowerment, and 
agricultural and land practices.  
3.5 Data Management 
 The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) collected the data. For 
the purpose of this research, I signed a formal data-sharing agreement with IFPRI to use 
the data for this research only. A committee member formerly affiliated with IFPRI 
shared the dataset using a password-protected, cloud-based application with the 
committee chair and me. The dataset is also stored on the student’s password-protected 
laptop hard drive for the data analysis for this research.  
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3.6 Measures 
The two main outcomes of the study related to child nutrition were IYCF practices for 
children 0-23 months and child nutritional status for children 0-59 months.  
3.6.1 Outcome Variables 
1. Infant and Young Child Feeding Practices (Manuscript 1): Indicators for each of the 
practices were based on the WHO guidelines.29 We chose the following four IYCF 
practices as they encompass main practices that affect nutrient intake in the first 24 
months of life. Early initiation focuses on an important feeding practice right after birth, 
exclusive breastfeeding is the recommended practice for the first six months for optimal 
nutrition, and minimum meal frequency and dietary diversity captures the quantity and 
quality of complementary foods, respectively, required from 6-23 months. 
a. Early Initiation: Whether a child aged 0-23 months was put to breast within an 
hour after birth.  
b. Exclusive breastfeeding for six months: Whether a child aged 0-5 months only 
had breast milk in the previous 24 hours of the survey.  
c. Minimum meal frequency (MMF): Whether a child 6-23 months received the 
required number of semi-solid and solid meals in the previous day. For breastfed 
children aged 6-8 months, the minimum number of meals is two, and three meals 
for breastfed children aged 9-23 months. Overall, the minimum number of meals 
for non-breastfed children aged 6-23 months is three.  
d. Dietary diversity: This measures the number of food groups consumed by a child 
aged 6-23 month in the previous 24 hours. The specific food groups are: 1) grains, 
roots, and tubers; 2) legumes and nuts; 3) dairy products; 4) flesh foods (meat, 
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fish, poultry, and organ meats); 5) eggs; 6) vitamin A rich fruits and vegetables; 
and 7) other fruits and vegetables.  
2. Child Nutritional Status (Manuscript 2): Standard deviation scores for length/height-
for-age (L/HAZ) based on the WHO growth standards were used.128 LAZ is applicable to 
children under 24 months and HAZ is applicable to children 24-59 months.  
3.6.2 Key Explanatory Variables  
1. Intra-household bargaining power (Manuscripts 1 and 2): This measurement for 
women and men was based on access to and control of resources and decision-making 
control. Women’s and men’s bargaining power was measured in four ways: 1) ownership 
and control of assets, 2) social participation, 3) workload, and 4) household decision-
making control. The variables for the specific domains were constructed as follows:  
We used ten household assets to form an additive scale to measure ownership and 
control of assets. Ownership and control of assets is commonly used as a proxy for 
measuring the economic domain of bargaining power.100,129 To measure control of assets, 
we used questions about decisions regarding renting and selling of assets used previously 
in studies on women’s empowerment in agriculture.22,23 The ten assets used were: 1) 
house and other structures, 2) large consumer durables (e.g., fridge, TV, sofa), 3) small 
consumer durables (e.g., radio, cookware), 4) mobile phone, 5) transportation (motorized 
or non-motorized), 6) agricultural land, 7) non-agricultural land, 8) non-mechanized farm 
equipment, 9) large livestock, and 10) small livestock. If the household had a particular 
asset, we first assessed if the respondent solely or jointly owned that specific asset. If a 
respondent solely or jointly owned an asset, we also considered if s/he was involved in 
sole or joint decision-making about selling or renting of that asset. For each asset, a value 
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of 1 was assigned if the respondent solely or jointly owned that asset and was also 
involved in sole or joint decision-making about selling or renting of that asset. Since our 
study focus was on intra-household bargaining, which relates to the relative 
socioeconomic position, we measured sole or joint ownership of assets as opposed to 
only sole ownership, which would indicate total autonomy. Values for all assets were 
summed to obtain a total score ranging from 0-10.  
Social participation for women and men was based on active group membership 
in different community-based groups, where the participant regularly attended meetings, 
engaged in discussions and/or volunteered. Participation in groups such as agricultural 
groups, water user’s, land/forest users’, credit or microfinance, mutual help or insurance 
group, trade or business association, civic groups, religious groups, mother’s group or 
other women’s groups was measured. A value of 1 was assigned for each group that a 
respondent participated. The total number of groups in which the respondent participated 
was calculated. This measure is previously used examining women’s empowerment in 
agriculture.22,23 Since a majority of those with group membership participated in one 
group we created a binary variable to indicate whether or not the respondent participated 
in any community group.  
Workload domain measured the total time spent by the respondent on work 
activities in a 24-hour period. Information was collected on all productive activities 
(work/ employment, agriculture activities, domestic work, and care for children/ 
adults/elders) and personal activities (sleeping and resting, personal care, time spent of 
leisure activities, and social and/or religious activities). To determine the workload, total 
time spent on domestic work, care for children and elders, wage work or employment, 
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and subsistence activities such as farming and livestock, and schoolwork was calculated, 
based on the respondent’s previous 24-hour recall. This measure is previously used in 
examining women’s empowerment in agriculture index.22,23   
Household decision-making control was based on respondent’s sole or joint 
household decision-making on household economy, health of the family and self, and 
domestic violence and mobility.2,82,130 Since our research focus was on intra-household 
bargaining, which relates to the relative socioeconomic position, we measured sole or 
joint decision-making as opposed to sole decision-making power. Sole decision-making 
implies complete autonomy.100 Decisions in households are usually made with several 
family members, and within the Nepali context, joint decision-making or support is more 
prevalent and favorable.131 Measuring sole or joint decision-making as opposed to sole-
decision-making captures that women’s status is related to other individuals within a 
household, which influences her bargaining power.131 Understanding if others are 
involved in decision-making helps identify potential for program engagement with the 
household members that may not only influence women’s bargaining power but also 
child nutrition. The eight decisions used to create this measure were: 1) major household 
expenditures such as on refrigerator or TV, 2) minor household expenditures such as food 
for daily consumption or other household necessities, 3) use of family planning products, 
4) respondent’s health and nutrition, 5) children’s healthcare, 6) child feeding, 7) how to 
keep from domestic violence, and 8) mobility to go to a relative or friend’s house. Men’s 
decision-making did not include items on domestic violence and mobility, therefore only 
six items were considered for men’s decision-making. For each joint decision, we also 
assessed the extent of decision-making control. The response scale for the extent to which 
 43 
the respondent feels s/he can contribute to the joint decision was measured as 1= not at 
all, 2= small extent, 3= some extent, 4= to a large extent.  For each type of decision, a 
person was adequate if s/he was the sole decision-maker, or for joint decision-making, if 
the respondent felt s/he can be involved at least to some extent of decision-making. We 
then calculated the proportion of a respondent’s involvement in sole or joint decision-
making. All decisions made in the household were computed for the denominator and a 
total of sole or joint decisions made served as the numerator.130 Manuscript 1 only 
included women’s bargaining domain variables, while manuscript 2 included men’s and 
women’s bargaining domains variables.  
2. Exposure to IYCF Information (Manuscript 1): This variable was measured as an 
additive scale from 0-8 based on if a mother had heard of eight IYCF practice-related 
messages. IYCF messages used were: 1) early initiation, 2) colostrum feeding, 3) 
exclusive breastfeeding for first six months, 4) not giving any water or liquids other than 
breast milk for the first six months, 5) starting complementary feeding (semi-solid/ 
mashed foods) at 6 months, 6) feeding eggs, fish, and meat to children older than 6 
months, 7) hand washing before feeding, and 8) how to feed a child during illness. Since 
the aim of this variable was to capture a mother’s access to IYCF information, an overall 
score (range: 0-8) of all messages was considered rather than using one or two specific 
messages related to each practice as a predictor for each outcome.  
3. Household Food Insecurity (Manuscript 2): Household food insecurity was measured 
using the Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS).132 The mean HFIAS score 
in our sample was skewed towards the lower end of the score range. Using linear 
transformation for the scale score would be inappropriate for mediation analysis to 
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compute the product of coefficients and determine the related direct and indirect effects. 
We, therefore, used the HFIAS prevalence categories as a continuous variable with a 
score ranging from 1 (food secure) to 4 (severely food insecure). To ensure our 
interpretation and inference of the results would not differ, we first analyzed the 
relationship between food insecurity prevalence as a categorical variable and the outcome 
child HAZ (Reference category= score 1;β= -0.120, p=0.040 for score 2; β = -0.0783, 
p=0.279 for score 3; β =-0.280, p=0.058 for score 4). We then tested the relationship 
between food insecurity prevalence as a continuous category and HAZ (β= -0.0507, 
p=0.022). Both methods showed an overall negative relationship between food insecurity 
and child nutrition. We also separately assessed food insecurity as an outcome using it as 
a continuous variable and as a categorical variable using the ordered logit model with 
women’s and men’s bargaining domains as the explanatory variables. The interpretation 
of the relationship between bargaining domains and food insecurity did not differ using 
continuous versus categorical variable. Hence, we used the HFIAS prevalence as a 
continuous variable.  
4. Covariates (Manuscripts 1 and 2) 
We considered certain maternal, child, and socioeconomic characteristics as 
potential confounders based on prior evidence suggesting an association with child HAZ, 
exposure to IYCF information, food insecurity, and/or bargaining power. For example, 
higher maternal education has been shown to be associated with higher HAZ, better food 
security, and bargaining power 133,134. Household wealth can affect food and health 
resources, which could influence child HAZ. Agro-ecological areas were used to control 
for geographic differences in feeding practices. The covariates used in all multivariable 
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analyses were child age, child gender, maternal age (years), maternal height 
(centimeters), maternal education (years of formal schooling), number of children under 
5 years in the household, household wealth (sum of number of small durable assets, large 
assets, and agricultural assets), whether the respondent was in the Suaahara intervention 
or control group, and agro-ecological zone of the household (Hills, Terai, Mountains).  
To account for clustering, we analyzed the variability of outcomes at the district 
level and the village development committee (VDC) level separately. We found more 
variability at the VDC level than the district level. Based estimates, the VDC level 
variability also accounted for the district level variability. We also assessed regression 
results using wards (240 clusters) as a random effect. The results from this analysis did 
not differ as compared to VDC being treated as random effects. Hence clustering was 
VDC level (80 clusters) was used as random effects for all multivariate models and 
mediation analysis.  
3.7 Analysis Plan: Manuscript 1 
Analyses were conducted in Stata SE version 14. Descriptive statistics were obtained 
through proportions or means and standard deviation. Bivariate relationships were 
assessed for each of the main explanatory variables of bargaining power, exposure to 
IYCF messages, and covariates with the four IYCF practices, separately. Simple logistic 
regression was used for bivariate analysis of early initiation, exclusive breastfeeding, and 
minimum meal frequency. Simple linear regression was used for dietary diversity.  
For multivariable analyses, generalized structural equation modeling (GSEM) 
using the gsem command, which allows for binary outcome variables, was used to 
estimate the path from each bargaining power domain variable to the exposure to IYCF 
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information measure, consequently leading to each of the four IYCF practices. We used 
the product-of-coefficients method for the path analysis to test for mediation.135 Using 
GSEM, we employed this product-of-coefficients method where two regression models 
were analyzed for each IYCF outcome- one model where each IYCF practice was 
regressed on the mediator (exposure to IYCF information), main explanatory variables of 
bargaining power, and covariates, and another model where the mediator (exposure to 
IYCF information) was regressed on the main explanatory bargaining variables and 
covariates. The indirect effect was obtained as a product of each bargaining domain 
coefficient on the mediator and the mediator coefficient on the outcomes. The coefficient 
between each of the bargaining domains and IYCF practices was the direct effect. 
We met the following three assumptions for the recursive path analysis.135 First, 
we found no exposure-mediator interaction by testing for interaction between each of the 
bargaining domains and exposure to IYCF information. Second, we included potential 
covariates in all regression analyses to account for confounding between bargaining 
power and exposure to IYCF information, bargaining power and IYCF practices, and 
exposure to IYCF information and IYCF practices based on previous evidence.63,134,136 
Third, we used path analysis with cross-sectional data and justified no reverse causality 
based on theory related to women’s empowerment that suggests women with greater 
access to resources and decision-making control are more likely to leverage their position 
for better health and nutrition outcomes58,85,86,137 and previous research that highlights 
this relationship.82,83,87 
Sociodemographic covariates (i.e., child age, child gender, maternal age, height, 
and education, number of children five years in a household, household wealth, if the 
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respondent was in Suaahara intervention or control group, and agro-ecological area) 
were used in all models. Child sickness in the past 15 days due to diarrhea or fever was 
included as a covariate for exclusive breastfeeding, minimum meal frequency, and 
dietary diversity, as sickness may influence child food intake.  In the mediation analysis, 
for the legs of the paths that were significant, the indirect effect was calculated as the 
product of the individual coefficients of each leg leading to the mediator and then to the 
outcome using the nlcom procedure to obtain appropriate test statistics, standard errors, 
and significance levels. All continuous variables were standardized. 
3.8 Analysis plan: Manuscript 2 
All analyses were conducted in Stata SE version 14. Descriptive statistics were 
obtained through proportions, or means and standard deviation, as relevant to the 
variables. Bivariate relationship with child HAZ using simple linear regression was 
assessed for each of the main explanatory variables of bargaining power, food insecurity, 
and control variables. To describe the household decision-making control between 
spouses, we calculated percent agreement and kappa to understand whether there was 
agreement on who was involved in specific household decisions. We assessed agreement 
on five household decisions: 1) major household expenditure, 2) minor household 
expenditure, 3) family planning decisions, 4) decisions regarding child’s health, and 5) 
decision regarding child feeding. Agreement was assessed using seven categories: 1) 
mother of child solely takes the decision, 2) father of child solely takes the decision, 3) 
spouses jointly take the decision, 4) spouses and another person involved in decision-
making, 5) mother and another person decides, 6) father and another person decides, and 
7) only others decide. The sample size for each decision differed because it was based on 
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whether or not both men and women had data on a particular decision and if a particular 
decision was made in a household. The response categories for persons involved in 
decision-making would only allow comparing joint decision between spouses. For 
example, if a mother responded that spouse makes a particular decision, she would be 
referring to the father of the index child. If a male member who is not the spouse of the 
mother responded to a question that spouse makes a particular decision; he would not be 
referring to the mother of the index child. Hence, the percent agreement was only 
assessed between spouses.  
We used multilevel modeling to assess the relationship between HAZ and 
women’s bargaining power, men’s bargaining power, women’s and men’s bargaining 
power together, and the interaction between women’s and men’s bargaining power to test 
if the relationship between women’s bargaining power and HAZ is dependent on men’s 
bargaining power.  
We used generalized structural equation modeling with household food insecurity 
as the mediator. Using GSEM, we employed this product-of-coefficients method where 
two regression models were analyzed- one model where child HAZ was regressed on the 
mediator (household food insecurity), main explanatory variables of bargaining power for 
women and/or men, and covariates, and another model where the mediator (household 
food insecurity) was regressed on the main explanatory bargaining variables and 
covariates. The indirect effect was obtained as a product of each bargaining domain 
coefficient on the mediator and the mediator coefficient on the outcome. The coefficient 
between each of the bargaining domains and child HAZ was the direct effect. 
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We met the following three assumptions for the recursive path analysis.135 First, 
we found no exposure-mediator interaction by testing for interaction between each of the 
women’s bargaining domains and household food insecurity, and except for men’s 
workload, there were no significant interactions between men’s bargaining domains and 
food insecurity. Based on the interaction estimates, the effect of food insecurity on men’s 
average workload was close to zero (-0.049); hence, men’s workload was included in the 
mediation analysis. Second, we included potential covariates in all regression analyses to 
account for confounding between bargaining power and household food insecurity, 
bargaining power and child HAZ, and food security and child HAZ based on previous 
evidence.63,134,136 Third, we used path analysis with cross-sectional data and justified no 
reverse causality based on theory related to women’s empowerment that suggests women 
with greater access to resources and decision-making control are more likely to leverage 
their position for better health and nutrition outcomes58,85,86,137 and previous research that 
highlights this relationship.82,83,87 
In the mediation analysis, for the legs of the paths that were significant, the 
indirect effect was calculated as the product of the individual coefficients of each leg 
leading to the mediator and then to the outcome using the nlcom procedure to obtain 
appropriate test statistics, standard errors, and significance levels. The indirect effect was 
compared to the total effect, i.e., the sum of indirect effect and direct effect to assess the 
relative contribution of the indirect path. Results are presented as standardized 
coefficients for all continuous variables. To understand if there would be any difference 
in findings between men’s sample that only included spouses of the mother as compared 
to the entire male respondent sample, we also analyzed models with the sample that only 
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included bargaining information on the father of the index child, n=1052. The results for 
this analysis did not differ from the main analysis and are therefore not presented further, 
but specific relevant findings were noted in the discussion section of the manuscript.  
3.9 Ethical Approval 
Ethical approval for the primary data collection was obtained from the Nepal 
Health Research Council and for secondary data analysis was obtained from the 
Institutional Review Board of University of South Carolina.
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
This chapter consists of two manuscripts that relate to the two specific aims of this 
dissertation research. Section 4.1 contains the first manuscript titled “Exposure to 
nutrition information as a linking mechanism between women’s intra-household 
bargaining power and infant and young child feeding practices in rural Nepal.” Section 
4.2 contains the second manuscript titled “Examining the relationship between gendered 
intra-household bargaining power, household food insecurity, and child nutritional 
status in rural Nepal.” 
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4.1 MANUSCRIPT 1 
Exposure to nutrition information as a linking mechanism between women’s intra-
household bargaining power and infant and young child feeding practices in rural 
Nepal1
                                                             
1 Kulkarni, S., Frongillo E.A., Cunningham K., Moore S., Blake C.E., To be submitted 
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ABSTRACT 
Objectives: Women’s intra-household bargaining power is an important determinant of 
child nutritional status, but there is limited evidence on how bargaining power relates to 
infant and young child feeding (IYCF) practices. The objectives of this study were to 1) 
understand which domains of bargaining power are associated with different IYCF 
practices, and 2) examine if women’s bargaining power is related to exposure to IYCF 
information, and if exposure to IYCF information is in turn associated with improved 
IYCF practices.  
Methods: We conducted a cross-sectional analysis of the baseline data from 2012 of the 
multi-sectoral program, Suaahara, in rural Nepal, focusing on households with a mother 
and child 0-23 months of age (n=1787). Women’s intra-household bargaining power 
consisted of four domains: 1) ownership and control of household assets, 2) social 
participation, 3) workload, and 4) household decision-making control. We used 
generalized structural equation modeling to examine if exposure to IYCF information 
mediated the relationship between the four bargaining domains and early initiation, 
exclusive breastfeeding, minimum meal frequency, and dietary diversity, separately.  
Results: Social participation was positively associated with exposure to IYCF 
information, which in turn was related to early initiation and dietary diversity. Household 
decision-making control was directly associated with exclusive breastfeeding. No 
domains were associated with minimum meal frequency. 
Conclusion: Social participation and household decision-making control are potentially 
important domains to consider for improving IYCF practices. Exposure to IYCF 
information is an important mechanism linking bargaining power and IYCF practices.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Promotion of appropriate infant and young child feeding (IYCF) practices is 
important for the reduction of child undernutrition.1–3 Despite a significant decline in the 
past two decades, the burden of child undernutrition in Nepal is still high and is coupled 
with poor IYCF practices.4–7 According to the 2016 Nepal Demographic and Health 
Survey, the prevalence of exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months of life was 66% 
and early initiation was 55%. The prevalence of minimum diet diversity among children 
aged 6-23 months was only 35%.4 Improving IYCF practices is an important priority for 
nutrition programs and policies to ensure proper health and nutrition in the first 1000 
days of life to prevent short- and long-term adverse human and economic 
consequences.8–12 
Women’s household status is an important determinant of child nutritional status 
13,14. Women’s status, as reflected in the intra-household bargaining power, refers to the 
relative social and economic position of a woman within a household for accessing and 
controlling resources, and her decision-making control.15–17 In our research, we 
conceptualize women’s intra-household bargaining power, henceforth referred to as 
bargaining power, as consisting of four domains: 1) ownership and control of household 
assets, 2) social participation, 3) workload- time spent working in a day, and 4) 
household decision-making control.18 In our research, we refer to the mothers of the 
children when discussing women’s bargaining power. We use women’s bargaining power 
as a resource for care, drawing from the Care for Nutrition conceptual framework by 
Engle et al. (1999).19 Women’s bargaining power is important for child feeding because 
following appropriate IYCF practices requires economic, social, and human capital 
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resources. Women’s bargaining power as a resource for care can enable women to access 
and be exposed to information, make informed decisions, and follow recommended IYCF 
practices.19   
One mechanism through which bargaining power is likely to be associated with 
feeding practices is by increasing their exposure to IYCF information. Bargaining power 
may provide women with economic and social resources, as well as the time to gain 
relevant nutrition information, thereby improving access to IYCF information.  
Ownership and control of assets may increase health care utilization by having 
material resources to access health care or health information. For example, ownership 
and control of assets can increase the availability of transportation to access health 
resources.20 Assets owned by women may provide greater access to potential 
communication channels such as TV, radios, telephones to access social and health 
information that provide IYCF messaging.21,22 
Social participation through group membership forms a resource for social 
capital.23 Social participation can facilitate information and knowledge exchange, which 
can improve access to health resources and knowledge networks related to child nutrition, 
thus improving IYCF practices.24 Membership in groups explicitly targeting nutrition-
sensitive information has shown considerable success in improving IYCF practices in 
South Asia.25 Evidence from Bangladesh also suggests that group membership positively 
relates to improved household dietary diversity,26 which in turn could relate to child 
dietary diversity. Women’s bargaining power in the social participation domain may, 
therefore, provide opportunities for interaction and health education to increase women’s 
exposure to nutrition messages and consequently relate to better IYCF practices.  
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Heavy workload and related time constraints may negatively affect maternal 
health care utilization such as uptake of ANC services or facility-based delivery, thereby 
limiting access to IYCF information.27,28 Time constraints can lead to inadequate care for 
young children and potentially influence whether a mother follows recommended IYCF 
practices.29–31 Household decision-making is shown to be positively related to health care 
utilization including seeking antenatal and postnatal care services,14 and can improve 
access and exposure to information, thus influencing IYCF practices.  
Improving exposure to IYCF information through different avenues such as mass 
media, improved health care utilization, targeted counseling, and peer support are 
common strategies used in behavior change interventions for improving IYCF 
practices.3,31,32 Studying exposure to IYCF information directly, rather than using a proxy 
measure such as availability of information or program participation, is critical as it is a 
known factor relating to IYCF practices; information is necessary to increase knowledge 
about feeding practices.33,34 
Prior studies on women’s bargaining power have mainly focused on child 
nutritional status.35,14 Evidence on how bargaining power relates to IYCF practices is 
limited.36–38 Studies have either focused on specific aspects of bargaining such as 
household decision-making or proxies such as level of education. There is also limited 
understanding of how domains such as social participation or workload affect different 
IYCF practices. Research is specifically needed to understand if and how individual 
domains of women’s bargaining power influence IYCF practices differently and to 
identify mechanisms through which this association is linked.35 Explaining the linkage 
between the different domains of bargaining power and IYCF practices contributes to 
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strengthening the scientific plausibility of this associative relationship. Understanding the 
mechanisms through which this relationship may be linked also provides input for 
evidence-based nutrition interventions.    
The objectives of this study were to 1) understand which domains of bargaining 
power are associated with different IYCF practices, and 2) examine if women’s 
bargaining power is related to exposure to IYCF information, and if exposure to IYCF 
information is in turn associated with improved IYCF practices.   
METHODS 
Study design and sampling 
We conducted a cross-sectional secondary data analysis of the Suaahara 
program’s baseline survey from 2012. Suaahara, a multisectoral intervention, aims to 
improve the health and nutrition status of women and children in Nepal by increasing 
access to quality health and nutrition services, improving health and nutrition behaviors, 
and improving coordination between government and non-governmental stakeholders for 
nutrition promoting strategies. The program, initially implemented from 2011-2016, is 
now in its second-phase (2016-2021) with interventions in 40 of Nepal’s 75 districts. 
Ethical approval for the data collection was obtained from the Nepal Health Research 
Council and for this secondary data analysis was obtained from the Institutional Review 
Board of University of South Carolina.  
The sample for the Suaahara survey was acquired through multistage cluster 
sampling. For the first stage, 16 districts (8 intervention and 8 matched comparison) were 
purposefully selected. A total of 80 Village Development Committees (VDCs) were 
selected using probability proportional to size for the second stage with 5 VDCs per 
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district. For the third stage, three rural wards were selected from each VDC using 
probability proportional to size to get a total of 240 wards. For the last stage, within each 
ward, 17 households with children under five years were randomly selected to obtain a 
total sample of 4,080 households. Within each household, one child less than five years 
of age was randomly selected as the index child for the survey and, if available, one child 
having the same biological mother as the index child was selected as the non-index child. 
The mother of the index child completed the household survey. Since the outcome 
variables for this analysis were IYCF practices, the sample only included data on children 
aged 0-23 months (n=1787).  
Data collection for the Suaahara baseline survey was conducted in 2012 by 
trained enumerators. Information from the mother was collected on child health and child 
care, IYCF practices, household food security, maternal diet diversity, women’s 
empowerment, information access, maternal health, IYCF knowledge, attitude, and 
perceptions, water sanitation and hygiene, child and maternal anthropometry, and 
hemoglobin. 
Outcome variables 
Four World Health Organization (WHO)-recommended IYCF practices were the 
outcome variables that capture the main practices to follow from birth to 24 months: 1) 
early initiation, 2) exclusive breastfeeding, 3) minimum meal frequency, and 4) dietary 
diversity.  We chose the following four IYCF practices as they encompass main practices 
that affect nutrient intake in the first 24 months of life. Early initiation focuses on an 
important feeding practice right after birth, exclusive breastfeeding is the recommended 
practice for the first six months for optimal nutrition, and minimum meal frequency and 
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dietary diversity captures the quantity and quality of complementary foods, respectively, 
required from 6-23 months. Early initiation was coded as a binary variable indicating if a 
child aged 0-23 months was put to the breast within an hour after birth. Exclusive 
breastfeeding was a binary variable indicating if a child aged 0-5 months only had breast 
milk in the previous 24 hours of the survey. Minimum meal frequency was a binary 
variable based on whether a child aged 6-23 months received the required number of 
semi-solid or solid meals or milk feeds in the previous day. For breastfed children aged 6-
8 months, the minimum number of meals is two, and for breastfed children aged 9-23 
months, the minimum number of meals is three.  The minimum number of meals for non-
breastfed children aged 6-23 months is four. Dietary diversity was a continuous variable 
that measured the consumption of foods among children aged 6-23 months in the 24 
hours prior to the survey, with foods grouped into 7 groups: 1) grains, roots, and tubers; 
2) legumes and nuts; 3) dairy products; 4) flesh foods (meat, fish, poultry, and organ 
meats); 5) eggs; 6) vitamin-A-rich fruits and vegetables; and 7) other fruits and 
vegetables. 
 Explanatory Variables 
Women’s bargaining power was measured through 4 domains: 1) ownership and 
control of household assets, 2) social participation, 3) workload, and 4) household 
decision-making control. The variables for the specific domains were constructed as 
described below. 
We used ten household assets to form an additive scale to measure ownership and 
control of assets. The ten assets used were: 1) house and other structures, 2) large 
consumer durables (e.g., fridge, TV, sofa), 3) small consumer durables (e.g., radio, 
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cookware), 4) mobile phone, 5) transportation (motorized or non-motorized), 6) 
agricultural land, 7) non-agricultural land, 8) non-mechanized farm equipment, 9) large 
livestock, and 10) small livestock. Based on if the household owned a particular asset, we 
first assessed if the respondent solely or jointly owned a specific asset. If a respondent 
solely or jointly owned an asset, we also considered if s/he was involved in sole or joint 
decision-making about selling or renting of that asset. For each asset, a value of 1 was 
assigned if the respondent solely or jointly owned that asset and was also involved in sole 
or joint decision-making about selling or renting of that asset.38,39 Since our study focus is 
on intra-household bargaining, which relates to the relative socioeconomic position, we 
measured sole or joint ownership of assets as opposed to only sole ownership, which 
would indicate total autonomy. Values for all assets were summed to obtain a total score 
ranging from 0-10.  
Social participation was based on active group membership, where the respondent 
regularly attended meetings, participation in discussions, and/or volunteered, in different 
community-based groups.38,39 Participation in groups such as agricultural groups, water 
user’s, land/forest users’, credit or microfinance, mutual help or insurance group, trade or 
business association, civic groups, religious groups, mother’s group or other women’s 
groups was measured. A value of 1 was assigned for each group that a respondent 
participated. The total number of groups in which the respondent participated was 
calculated. As a majority of those with group membership participated in one group, we 
created a binary variable to indicate whether or not the respondent participated in any 
community group.  
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Workload domain measured the total time spent by women on work activities in a 
24-hour period.38,39 Information was collected on all productive and personal activities 
such as sleeping and resting, personal care, work/ employment, domestic work, care for 
children/ adults/elders, time spent of leisure activities, and social and/or religious 
activities. To determine the workload, total time spent on domestic work, care for 
children and elders, wage work or employment, and subsistence activities such as 
farming and livestock, and school work was calculated based on the respondent’s 
previous 24-hour recall.  
Household decision-making was measured as the proportion of household 
decisions in which the respondent had sole or joint decision-making control.40 The eight 
decisions used to create this measure were: 1) major household expenditures such as 
refrigerator or TV, 2) minor household expenditures such as food for daily consumption 
or other household necessities, 3) use of family planning products, 4) respondent’s health 
and nutrition, 5) children’s healthcare, 6) child feeding, 7) how to keep from domestic 
violence, and 8) mobility to go to a relative or friend’s house. For each joint decision, we 
also assessed the extent of decision-making control. The response scale for the extent to 
which the respondent feels she can contribute to the joint decision was measured as 1= 
not at all, 2= small extent, 3= some extent, 4= to a large extent.  For each type of 
decision, a person was adequate if she was the sole decision-maker, or for joint decision-
making, if the respondent felt she can be involved at least to some extent of decision-
making. To calculate the proportion of women involved in sole or joint decision-making, 
all decisions made in the household were computed for the denominator and a total of 
sole or joint decisions made served as the numerator.  
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Exposure to IYCF information was measured as an additive scale from 0-8 based 
on if a mother had heard of eight IYCF practice-related messages. IYCF messages used 
were: 1) early initiation, 2) colostrum feeding, 3) exclusive breastfeeding for first six 
months, 4) not giving any water or liquids other than breast milk for the first six months, 
5) starting complementary feeding (semi-solid/ mashed foods) at 6 months, 6) feeding 
eggs, fish, and meat to children older than 6 months, 7) hand washing before feeding, and 
8) how to feed a child during illness. Since the aim of this variable was to capture a 
mother’s exposure to IYCF information, an overall score (range: 0-8) of all messages was 
considered rather than using one or two specific messages related to each practice as a 
mediator for each outcome.  
We considered certain maternal, child, and socioeconomic characteristics and 
geographical factors as potential confounders based on prior evidence suggesting an 
association with child feeding practices, exposure to IYCF information, and/or bargaining 
power. For example, higher maternal education has been shown to be associated with 
improved breastfeeding practices, access to information, and bargaining power.41–43 Child 
age is associated with age-specific feeding practices through the first 24 months. 
Household wealth can affect food and health resources, which could influence feeding 
practices and access to information. Agro-ecological areas were used to control for 
geographic differences in access to food and feeding practices. The covariates used in all 
multivariable analyses were child age, child gender, maternal age (years), maternal height 
(centimeters), maternal education (years of formal schooling), number of children under 
5 years in the household, household wealth (sum of number of small durable assets, large 
assets, and agricultural assets), if the respondent was in Suaahara intervention or control 
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group, and agro-ecological zone of the household (Hills, Terai, Mountains). Child 
sickness in the past 15 days due to diarrhea or fever was included as a covariate for 
exclusive breastfeeding, minimum meal frequency, and dietary diversity, as sickness may 
influence child food intake.  Clustering of observations within the village development 
committees (80 clusters) was accounted for using the vce option to get the appropriate 
standard errors.  
Statistical Analysis 
Analyses were conducted in Stata SE version 14. Descriptive statistics were 
obtained through proportions or means and standard deviation. Bivariate relationships 
were assessed for each of the main explanatory variables of bargaining power, exposure 
to IYCF messages, and covariates with the four IYCF practices, separately. Simple 
logistic regression was used for bivariate analysis of early initiation, exclusive 
breastfeeding, and minimum meal frequency. Simple linear regression was used for 
dietary diversity. Irrespective of the significance value of the findings in bivariate 
analysis, all bargaining domain variables were included in multivariable analyses.  
Generalized structural equation modeling (GSEM) allows for path analysis using 
categorical variables. We used the product-of-coefficients method for the path analysis to 
test for mediation (Figure 4.1).44 Using GSEM, we employed this product-of-coefficients 
method where two regression models were analyzed for each IYCF outcome- one model 
where each IYCF practice was regressed on the mediator (exposure to IYCF 
information), main explanatory variables of bargaining power, and covariates, and 
another model where the mediator (exposure to IYCF information) was regressed on the 
main explanatory bargaining variables and covariates. The indirect effect was obtained as 
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a product of each bargaining domain coefficient on the mediator and the mediator 
coefficient on the outcomes. The coefficient between each of the bargaining domains and 
IYCF practices was the direct effect.  
We met the following three assumptions for the recursive path analysis.44 First, 
we found no exposure-mediator interaction by testing for interaction between each of the 
bargaining domains and exposure to IYCF information. Second, we included potential 
covariates in all regression analyses to account for confounding between bargaining 
power and exposure to IYCF information, bargaining power and IYCF practices, and 
exposure to IYCF information and IYCF practices based on previous evidence.45–47 
Third, we used path analysis with cross-sectional data and justified no reverse causality 
based on theory related to women’s empowerment that suggests women with greater 
access to resources and decision-making control are more likely to leverage their position 
for better health and nutrition outcomes48–51 and previous research that highlights this 
relationship.35,14,52 
A total of four models were analyzed, one for each IYCF outcome. The mediator 
in each model was exposure to IYCF information. In mediation analysis, for the legs of 
the paths that were significant, the indirect effect was calculated as the product of the 
individual coefficients of each leg leading to the mediator and then to the outcome using 
the nlcom procedure to obtain appropriate test statistics, standard errors, and significance 
levels. All continuous variables were standardized.  
RESULTS 
 The prevalence of appropriate IYCF practices was generally low in the sample. 
Early initiation of breastfeeding was reported in 39% of the sample and 49.3% were 
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exclusively breastfed, while minimum meal frequency was 72.2% and on average 
children consumed foods from three of the seven food groups and nearly 45.6% met the 
minimum dietary diversity cut-off of consuming foods from 4 of the 7 food groups (Table 
4.1). Women were solely or jointly involved in three-quarters (75.6%) of household 
decisions. The mean asset ownership and control score was 2.8. Sixteen percent of the 
mothers actively participated in one or more community groups, and on average worked 
for 10.9 hours in a day. Mothers had heard about five of the eight IYCF messages.  
 None of the bargaining domains were significantly associated in bivariate 
analyses with early initiation or dietary diversity (Table 4.2). Workload was positively 
associated with minimum meal frequency. Household decision-making was positively 
associated with exclusively breastfeeding at P-value less than 0.1. Access to IYCF 
information was associated with higher odds of early initiation by about 12% and with 
higher diet diversity by 0.1 food groups, but was not associated with the other two child 
feeding variables.  
In the mediation analysis, exposure to IYCF information was positively 
associated with early initiation and dietary diversity. Social participation was positively 
associated with exposure to IYCF message for all four domains (Table 4.3). Social 
participation did not have a direct significant relationship with any of the IYCF 
outcomes. Social participation had a significant indirect effect on early initiation at P-
value less than 0.05 and dietary diversity at P-value less than 0.1.  
Ownership and control of assets did not have a significant direct or indirect 
relationship with any of the IYCF outcomes. Women’s workload was borderline 
significant with exposure to IYCF message for early initiation (p=0.044), but did not 
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have a direct relationship with any of the other IYCF outcomes. Household decision-
making had a significant positive and direct relationship with early initiation and 
exclusive breastfeeding, but did not have a significant direct or indirect relationship with 
other domains.  
DISCUSSION 
 Our study suggests that social participation is likely to be important for improved 
IYCF practices and that exposure to IYCF information may be an important linking 
mechanism between bargaining power and IYCF practices. Social participation was 
associated with higher exposure to IYCF information that was subsequently associated 
with early initiation and dietary diversity. Household decision-making had a direct 
positive relationship with exclusive breastfeeding and early initiation. None of the other 
domains were significantly related to early initiation and diet diversity, and no significant 
direct or indirect relationships were observed with minimum meal frequency.  
Social participation was positively associated with exposure to information, which 
in turn was associated with early initiation and diet diversity. The association between 
social participation and exposure to IYCF knowledge is consistent with findings from 
other studies. Group membership in specific nutrition education or mother-to-mother 
support groups has shown to have a positive association with maternal information and 
knowledge.53,54 For example, participation in a group-based maternal education program 
in eastern India improved dietary diversity in children under two years.55 Group-based 
approach is increasingly considered as an important strategy to improve maternal and 
child nutrition outcomes through multiple social, economic, and agricultural paths.25,56 
Evidence also suggests that group membership through targeted nutrition programming 
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and relevant messages are most effective in bringing about positive results.25 Our 
findings on mediation through exposure to IYCF practices lend empirical evidence to a 
possible path of social participation that increases awareness of appropriate IYCF 
practices, which is then translated to following the recommended IYCF practices. The 
findings from our path analysis may also suggest that increase in social participation may 
increase access to multiple health information resources through improved uptake of 
services and higher frequency of social interaction to be exposed to the IYCF messages.57 
The positive relationship between social participation and exposure to IYCF practices 
may also highlight higher mobility in women to access information, which is important 
for bargaining power.  
Group membership is a part of structural social capital,58 which also includes 
network size and characteristics, such as literacy level, or cognitive social capital. While 
not available in our dataset, these social capital factors may also play an important role in 
child nutrition outcomes.59 For example, cognitive social capital, which captures 
dimensions of trust, social harmony, and cohesion, is consistently shown to be associated 
with child nutrition.60 Our results on the positive relationship between exposure to IYCF 
messages and early initiation and dietary diversity also suggest possible increase in 
knowledge that may affect following recommended practices. Gaining knowledge and 
improving awareness are cognitive processes that need further investigation to understand 
how they may relate to bargaining power and IYCF practices.  
 Household decision-making was significantly associated with exclusive 
breastfeeding and early initiation. This finding is consistent with several studies showing 
that increased household decision-making is related to improved IYCF practices. For 
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example, with regards to exclusive breastfeeding, financial autonomy was positively 
associated with breastfeeding in infants 3-5 months in rural India.37 Mother’s autonomy 
in child feeding is shown to be positively associated with exclusive breastfeeding in 
Vietnam.61 Our results may likely be driven by the fact that a majority of the mothers 
made the household decision-making child health and child feeding, which is especially 
critical for exclusive breastfeeding. Household decision-making was significantly related 
to exposure to IYCF messages, which suggests that other decisions such as on mobility or 
expenditure may also be important to be exposed to relevant information. Exposure to 
IYCF messages did not mediate the relationship between household decision-making and 
exclusive breastfeeding, which may be related to relatively smaller sample size 
insufficient to capture the effect of the relationship.  
 The lack of a significant relationship between household decision-making with 
other IYCF practices suggest that other practices may require support from other 
members of the family or community and/or may be dependent on other household 
aspects such as food security or access to health care in addition to having decision-
making control. Prior literature on household decision-making and IYCF practices has 
been limited with mixed results for complementary feeding practices. For example, 
household decision-making was only significantly related to minimum meal frequency 
and minimal acceptable diet in two countries out of 10 countries in a multi-country study 
from sub-Saharan Africa.62 Mothers with low involvement in household decision-making 
had lower dietary diversity in a review of factors affecting feeding practices in South 
Asia, however the effect size was small.63 Women in South Asia have overall low 
household decision-making control.64 Material resource constraints for food acquisition 
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and preparation may hinder mother’s provision of adequate quantity and quality of food 
and have a differential effect on IYCF practices than decision-making. Some of the effect 
on feeding practices may also be influenced by other female figures in the household 
such as mothers-in-law, therefore, understanding the relative bargaining power of the 
mother in comparison to the mother-in-law may provide information on other household 
members who can affect child feeding.  
  Ownership and control of assets was not positively associated with increased 
exposure to IYCF information or any of the IYCF practices. This is contrary to 
expectation because women with more assets may more likely have higher exposure to 
IYCF information, as they may be better able to access resources that provide health 
information having access to transportation to seek care and information, possessing 
media such as TV, radio, and phone, which can help with improved access to 
information.20–22,65–67 Regression analyses to examine the relationship between ownership 
and control of individual assets and IYCF information (results not shown) suggested 
owning a phone was positively associated with exposure to IYCF information. While 
more research is needed to provide empirical evidence on mobile health technology, 
IYCF messages, and related practices, studies exploring the relationship between 
different forms of media suggest that, given the rapid increase in mobile usage in 
developing countries, this avenue should be exploited for access to information.22,68 Our 
finding on the relationship of individual assets with IYCF information suggests that more 
research is needed to understand and evaluate the trade-offs between using a whole scale 
measure versus more specific items that focus on distinct aspects on gaining nutrition 
knowledge and improving practices.  
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Ownership and control of assets did not have a direct association with any of the 
IYCF outcomes. While women’s economic independence may relate to child nutrition, 
with regards to IYCF practices, the results have been mixed. For example, in India, 
maternal wealth as determined by her employment and household wealth had no 
significant positive association with IYCF practices.69 In resource-poor settings, mothers 
may prioritize finances to cover costs that affect the whole household or may to choose 
quantity of food to satiate hunger over dietary diversity, which may be more cost 
prohibitive, thus access to and control of economic resources may not have a large effect 
on IYCF practices. 
 Workload was not significantly associated with IYCF practices. This finding is 
contrary to our expectation. Care for children could be compromised when mothers have 
a higher workload and more time is allocated to other activities or if children are left 
unattended.70 Working mothers may not get enough opportunity to exclusively breastfeed 
their child.30,31,71 Time allocation may be contextual and may affect IYCF practices 
differently. For example, data from women’s empowerment in agriculture in five 
countries suggest that women involved in agricultural activities have greater diet 
diversity and that this was related to production diversity.29 Therefore, women spending 
more time working for wages or in subsistence agriculture may be able to provide diverse 
foods, irrespective of access to information. We also did not find any significant indirect 
effect through exposure to IYCF information for workload except for a small effect with 
early initiation. Research related to health-seeking behavior or healthcare utilization in 
India, Vietnam, and Ethiopia show that heavy workload and time constraints limit a 
woman’s ability to seek care.27,71,72 Future research can help our understanding of 
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specific aspects of women’s time allocation for care practices that may relate most to 
IYCF practices.  
 We did not find a significant relationship between all domains and child nutrition, 
which highlights that specific bargaining domains may be key in improving practices. For 
example, higher household decision-making was directly associated with exclusive 
breastfeeding and to a small extent with early initiation. Given a mother’s role as a 
primary caregiver, mothers would be expected to be more involved in child feeding-
related decision-making. Lack of a significant finding between the economic domain and 
either breastfeeding and early initiation suggests that while women may be better able to 
access health resources if they have more economic control, this control and access to 
economic resources likely has less effect on breastfeeding feeding behaviors. Conversely, 
women’s social participation is more likely to be associated with information to IYCF 
information and dietary diversity, which suggests that domains other than decision-
making control are more important to affect complementary feeding behaviors that 
involve interactions or process other than only the mother and the child. No significant 
direct relationship between other domains may suggest the need for measures that capture 
specific aspects of IYCF practices. For example, information on economic control of 
food resources or food expenditure may more precisely capture the relationship between 
economic control of resources and dietary diversity. Similarly, measures for assessing 
time spent in feeding or food-related practices for the child may be helpful in 
understanding the overall workload in relation to child feeding practices. 
 To our knowledge, this is the first study to have simultaneously examined several 
domains of household bargaining and several IYCF practices in South Asia. This study 
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provides a comprehensive view of the social, economic, and cultural aspects of household 
bargaining power and IYCF practices. Additionally, we focused on testing a possible 
mechanism linking bargaining power and IYCF outcomes. Understanding potential 
mechanisms is essential for elucidating the nature of relationships between bargaining 
power and IYCF practices. Our study shows that certain bargaining domains are related 
to accessing IYCF information, thereby highlighting the need for behavior change 
interventions to address gender-related barriers in gaining access to IYCF information.  
 The cross-sectional data do not allow us to make any causal inferences. Owing to 
the specific age-range for exclusive breastfeeding, our sample size for this outcome was 
small. The data for the different bargaining domains and IYCF practices are self-
reported; therefore the possibility of socially biased responses cannot be ruled out, 
especially for responses related to household decision-making. For social participation, 
availability of measures about network characteristics may have provided a more 
nuanced view of its relationship with IYCF information access and IYCF practices.  
 Future research could focus on specific aspects of the individual domains of 
bargaining. For example, cognitive aspects of social capital such as trust, perceived 
support, and/or reciprocity could be combined with the structural aspects of participation 
and size of the network to understand the relative contribution of each aspect to influence 
IYCF practices. Mechanisms linking bargaining power to knowledge or intention of 
IYCF practices could be assessed to provide evidence of relationship between bargaining 
and cognitive processes such as knowledge and intention, which are shown to be 
associated with practices.73 Since exposure to IYCF information could potentially 
promote nutrition knowledge and possible practices through more social participation, 
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greater investments could be made to improve women’s participation. Combining 
nutrition messaging with social participation can help maximize women’s use of social 
resources and time to build social capital, offer opportunities to economically contribute 
to the household, and improve nutrition knowledge and related-self efficacy. 
Interventions could also focus on involving mothers and grandmothers, who are known to 
influence feeding habits and are involved in child feeding to participate together in 
group-based programs to target multiple members of the household who can support a 
mother in following appropriate IYCF practices. Overall, our study highlights that 
addressing poor feeding practices will require strengthening women’s bargaining power 
and exposure to IYCF information.  
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of child, maternal, and household characteristics for 
children under 24 months and their mothers in Suaahara study in Nepal 
Variable N  Mean (SD) or % Range 
Child Characteristics     
Child age (months)    1787 12.3 (6.74) 0-23.9 
Child gender (female) 1787 49.3 - 
Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) practices    
Early initiation (age: 0-23 mo) 1787 39.0 - 
Exclusive breastfeeding (age: 0-6 mo) 385 49.3 - 
Minimum meal frequency (age: 6-23 mo) 1402 72.2 - 
Minimum dietary diversity (age: 6-23 mo) 1402 45.58 - 
Dietary diversity score (age: 6-23 mo) 1402 3.33 (1.20) 0-7 
Maternal Characteristics    
Intra-household bargaining domains 
Ownership and control of assets 
Social participation (%) 
Social participation score 
Time allocated to work/ 24 hours 
Proportion of Household decision-making 
 
1787 
1679 
1679 
1787 
1787 
 
2.78 (2.25) 
15.72  
0.21(0.55) 
10.98 (2.98) 
75.6 (21.4) 
 
0-9 
- 
0-5 
0.58-18.9 
0-100 
Exposure to IYCF information 1787 4.82(2.07) 0-8 
Maternal age (years) 1787 24.9 (5.59) 15-52 
Maternal height (cm) 1786 151.6 (5.50) 133.2-179.5 
Maternal years of schooling 1786 5.16 (4.48) 0-15 
Household Characteristics    
Children under 5 years 1787 1.42 (0.62) 1-5 
Household wealth (assets) 1787 5.81 (3.65) 0-26 
Agro-ecological area 
Mountain 
Hills 
Terai 
1787  
25.1 
50.6 
24.3 
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Table 4.2: Bivariate associations of child, maternal, and household characteristics with 
IYCF practices in children 0-24 months in Suaahara study in Nepal 
Variable Early 
initiation 
N=1677 
OR 
(P-value) 
Exclusive 
breastfeeding 
 
N=362  
OR 
(P-value) 
Minimum 
meal 
frequency 
N=1315 
OR 
(P-value) 
Dietary 
Diversity 
N=1315 
Coefficient  
(P-value) 
Child Characteristics      
Child age (months) 0.996 
(P=0.593) 
0.491 
(P<0.001) 
1.044 
(P<0.001) 
0.0720 
(P<0.001)  
Child gender (female) 0.920 
(0.402) 
1.359 
(P=0.146) 
 
 
1.277 
(0.049) 
0.0836 
(P=0.208) 
Maternal Characteristics     
Ownership and control of 
assets 
 
0.984 
(P=0.457) 
 
 
1.0308 
(P=0.523) 
1.004 
(P=0.870) 
-0.00563 
(P=0.702) 
Social Participation 
 
 
0.885 
(P=0.376) 
1.307 
(P=0.378) 
0.976 
(P=0.886) 
0.147 
(P=0.102) 
Workload 
 
 
0.989 
(P=0.525) 
0.949 
(P=0.108) 
1.046 
(P=0.033) 
0.00991 
(P=0.389) 
 
Household decision-
making 
1.175 
(P=0.490) 
 
2.468 
(P=0.076) 
0.951 
(P=0.863) 
-0.0536 
(P=0.730) 
Exposure to IYCF 
information 
1.116 
(P<0.001) 
1.020 
(P=0.720) 
1.005 
(P=0.874) 
0.0968 
(p<0.001) 
Maternal age (years) 0.973 
(0.004) 
0.999 
(0.960) 
0.990 
(P=0.383) 
-0.0133 
(P=0.030) 
Maternal height (cm) 1.011 
(0.234) 
1.046 
(P=0.022) 
0.996 
(P=0.758) 
0.0109 
(P=0.069) 
Maternal years of 
schooling 
1.028 
(0.013) 
0.965 
(P=0.121) 
1.020 
(P=0.148) 
0.0622 
(P<0.001) 
Household 
Characteristics 
    
hildren under 5 years 0.935 
(0.412) 
1.171 
(P=0.296) 
 
0.904 
(0.334) 
-0.265 
(P<0.001) 
Household wealth (assets) 1.019 
(0.179) 
0.920 
(P=0.005) 
0.979 
(0.220) 
0.0595 
(P<0.001) 
Agro-ecological area 
Mountain 
Hills 
 
Terai 
 
Ref 
1.194 
(P=0.146) 
1.127 
(P=0.408) 
 
Ref 
0.979 
(P=0.936) 
0.426 
(P=0.004) 
 
Ref 
0.560 
(P<0.001) 
0.478 
(P<0.001) 
 
Ref 
0.0622 
(P=0.435) 
-0.166 
(P=0.087) 
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Table 4.3: Individual path coefficients for relationship between the bargaining domains, 
exposure to IYCF information, and IYCF outcomes 
 
a Leg 1 denotes the relationship between bargaining domains and exposure to IYCF information, the first 
leg of the indirect path. 
b Leg 2 denotes the relationship between exposure to IYCF information and IYCF outcomes, the second leg 
of the indirect path. 
c Direct effect denotes the direct path from bargaining domains and IYCF outcomes. 
d Total indirect effect calculated for significant paths for leg1 and leg2 and is the product of coefficients of 
leg 1 and leg 2 
 
 Early initiation 
 
 
N=1677 
Exclusive 
breastfeeding 
 
N=362 
Minimum Meal 
frequency 
N=1315 
Dietary 
Diversity 
 
N=1315 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Leg 1 a     
Ownership 
& control of assets 
0.00754 
(P=0.845) 
-0.0506 
(P=0.449) 
0.0290 
(P=0.467) 
0.0290 
(P=0.467) 
Social 
participation 
0.266 
(P<0.001) 
0.390 
(P<0.001) 
0.214 
(P=0.013) 
0.214 
(P=0.013) 
Workload 0.0526 
(P=0.044) 
0.0476 
(P=0.331) 
0.0492 
(P=0.096) 
0.0492 
(P=0.096) 
Household 
decision-making 
0.0131 
(P=0.710) 
0.0783 
(P=0.064) 
-0.0150 
(P=0.699) 
-0.0150 
(P=0.699) 
Leg 2 b     
Exposure to IYCF 
Information 
0.241 
(P=0.001) 
0.185 
(P=0.202) 
-0.00754 
(P=0.925) 
0.0596 
(P=0.014) 
Direct Effect c     
Ownership 
& Control of assets 
-0.0912 
(P=0.300) 
-0.172 
(P=0.346) 
0.0278 
(P=0.753) 
-0.0205 
(P=0.404) 
Social 
Participation 
-0.210 
(P=0.209) 
0.218 
(P=0.572) 
-0.197 
(P=0.239) 
-0.0514 
(P=0.466) 
Workload -0.0287 
(P=0.611) 
0.0205 
(P=0.898) 
0.0893 
(P=0.159) 
0.0167 
(P=0.478) 
Household 
decision-making 
0.132 
(P=0.042) 
0.350 
(P=0.036) 
-0.0105 
(P=0.898) 
0.0337 
(P=0.203) 
Indirect  
Effect d 
Social 
Participation 
 
 
0.0642 
(P=0.010) 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
0.0128 
(P=0.071) 
Workload 0.0127 
(P=0.080) 
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  Figure 4.1: Path diagram for generalized structural equation modeling  
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Examining the relationship between gendered intra-household bargaining power, 
household food insecurity, and child nutritional status in rural Nepal2 
                                                             
2 Kulkarni S., Frongillo E.A., Cunningham K., Moore S., Blake C.E. To be submitted 
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ABSTRACT 
Objectives: Women’s intra-household bargaining power is an important determinant of 
child nutritional status, but more research is needed to understand how men’s bargaining 
power individually and together with women’s bargaining power is related to child 
nutrition and the mechanisms through which this linkage occurs. The objectives of this 
study were to 1) understand how intra-household bargaining of women and men is related 
to child height-for-age z-score (HAZ), and 2) if household food insecurity mediates the 
relationship between women’s and men’s intra-household bargaining and HAZ because 
food insecurity is an important predictor of child nutritional status, and is also shown to 
be associated with women’s bargaining power.  
Methods: We conducted a cross-sectional analysis of the baseline data from 2012 for an 
impact evaluation of the Suaahara program in rural Nepal in 2,166 households with 
children aged 0-59 months, their mothers, and their fathers or other male respondents 
involved in making major household economic decisions. Intra-household bargaining 
power for women and men consisted of four domains: 1) ownership and control of assets, 
2) social participation, 3) workload, and 4) household decision-making control. We used 
multilevel modeling to assess the relationship between HAZ and women’s bargaining 
power, men’s bargaining power, women’s and men’s bargaining power together, and the 
interaction between women’s and men’s bargaining power. Generalized structural 
equation modeling was used to test household food insecurity as a mediator.  
Results: In the multilevel analysis, women’s workload was negatively associated with 
HAZ in the women’s bargaining model and in the combined model of women’s and 
men’s bargaining, while men’s social participation was positively associated with HAZ in 
the men’s bargaining model and the combined model. No significant interactions were 
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found between men’s and women’s bargaining domains suggesting that the relationship 
between women’s bargaining and child HAZ was not moderated by men’s bargaining 
power. Food insecurity was a partial mediator such that women’s ownership and control 
of assets and men’s social participation were negatively associated with food insecurity, 
which in turn was negatively associated with child HAZ.  
Conclusions: Women’s workload and ownership and control of assets, and men’s social 
participation, may be important domains to improve child HAZ. Program strategies could 
include comprehensively promoting women’s bargaining power, while also promoting 
men’s engagement in nutrition programming.  
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades, Nepal has experienced a significant reduction in the 
prevalence of child undernutrition.1,2 This encouraging downward trend, however, still 
shows a substantial burden of child undernutrition with 36% of children below five years 
being classified as stunted.1 Efforts to reduce child undernutrition are critical because 
adverse effects of stunting span across the life course in early childhood development, 
schooling outcomes, adult health and nutrition, birth outcomes, productivity, and income 
and wages.3–5 Strategies for reducing undernutrition increasingly employ nutrition-
specific and nutrition-sensitive interventions that address the socioeconomic and cultural 
factors that influence child nutrition including women’s household status.6,7  
Women’s status is an important determinant of child nutritional status.8,9 
Women’s household status is reflected in intra-household bargaining power, which refers 
to the relative social and economic position of a woman within a household.10–12 
Bargaining power encompasses two aspects: access to and control of resources, and 
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decision-making control.11 An individual’s access to economic resources such as assets 
and social resources such as social capital can increase their influence within the 
household and improve knowledge and awareness. Higher decision-making control may 
indicate greater bargaining to influence health, economic, and social decisions that can 
affect self or others.11 In resources poor-settings, time allocation is critical for women as 
they are involved in domestic and productive work, thereby creating gendered workload, 
which can influence access to and control of other social, economic, and health resources 
and may negatively impact bargaining power within the household.13,14  
Improved child nutritional status is generally associated with mothers who have 
more social and economic resources at their disposal and better decision-making control 
in the household.15,9 While there is evidence on the relationship between women’s 
bargaining power and child nutrition, two related issues that need greater attention in 
research, programs, and policies are: 1) understanding the role of men’s bargaining power 
in child nutrition, and 2) identifying the mechanisms linking intra-household bargaining 
power and child nutrition.  
In South Asia, deeply-rooted patriarchal systems greatly determine the household 
power structure and women’s low bargaining power within a household.16,17 Studying 
men’s role in intra-household bargaining would provide a comprehensive picture of 
household dynamics and its possible influence on child nutrition. To date, literature on 
men’s role in child nutrition has mainly focused on father’s education as a determinant or 
confounder of child nutritional status or health, and is shown to be associated with 
significantly lower odds of stunting, better paternal health knowledge, and improved 
health practices such as vitamin A supplementation, use of iodized salt, and child 
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immunization.18,19 Greater agreement on who makes household decisions between 
spouses has been shown to be associated with better family planning, and maternal and 
child health care utilization such as seeking antenatal care.20,21 The above evidence 
suggests that men’s bargaining power is related to several predictors of child nutrition 
and that men may play an important role in child’s health and related behaviors through 
their influence on decisions.  Hence, it is essential to understand how men’s bargaining 
power relates to child nutritional status. As research and interventions move toward 
addressing more distal factors of child nutrition, examining men’s role in child nutrition 
is critical in gaining a nuanced understanding on how specific domains of bargaining for 
women and men may differentially influence child nutrition 
Food insecurity is an important household determinant that is associated with 
women’s bargaining power and child nutrition.22 Women’s bargaining power is critical in 
ensuring food security as women play a significant role in food production, procurement, 
and preparation 6,23. Studies on women’s empowerment in agriculture in Bangladesh and 
Nepal demonstrate its positive association with greater maternal and child dietary 
diversity.24,25 Women’s bargaining power can also promote more equitable allocation of 
economic resources to acquire food within the household for the mother and child, 
thereby resulting in better food security.26–28 Consequently, food security can improve 
dietary quantity and quality, and may have a positive effect on child nutritional status. 
For example, a study in India showed that household food insecurity was associated with 
lower child dietary diversity, and that child dietary diversity was a significant predictor of 
stunting.29 Elucidating paths between gendered bargaining power and child nutrition 
through food insecurity helps to address the current research gap on understanding 
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mechanisms through which women’s status operates and relates to child nutrition.15,30 
Understanding the linking mechanisms can also suggest key factors that could be 
addressed through targeted nutrition interventions.31–34 
Prior studies in Nepal on women’s empowerment in agriculture have shown that 
specific domains related to workload and leisure, and gender parity in empowerment are 
associated child nutritional status. In this paper, we attempt to further the research on 
household bargaining power by 1) specifically understanding the relationship of different 
domains of men’s bargaining power with child nutritional status including examining 
household decision-making control not done in prior studies, and 2) understanding 
mechanisms that link women’s and men’s bargaining power with child nutritional status.  
The aim of our study was to understand the relationship between gendered intra-
household bargaining and child nutritional status in rural Nepal. The specific objectives 
of this study were to 1) examine how women’s and men’s bargaining power is related to 
child HAZ, and 2) assess if household food insecurity mediates the relationship between 
women’s and men’s bargaining power and child HAZ.  
METHODS 
Study design and sampling 
We conducted a secondary data analysis of the Suaahara program’s cross-
sectional baseline dataset, collected by trained enumerators in 2012. Suaahara, a multi-
sectoral intervention, aims to improve the health and nutrition status of women and 
children in Nepal by increasing access to quality health and nutrition services, improving 
health and nutrition behaviors, and improving coordination between government and 
non-governmental stakeholders for nutrition promoting strategies. The program, initially 
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implemented from 2011-2016, is now in its second-phase (2016-2021) with interventions 
in 42 of Nepal’s 77 districts. Ethical approval for data collection was obtained from the 
Nepal Health Research Council and for this secondary data analysis was obtained from 
the Institutional Review Board of University of South Carolina.  
The sample for the Suaahara survey was acquired through multistage cluster 
sampling. For the first stage, 16 districts (8 intervention and 8 matched comparison) were 
purposefully selected. A total of 80 Village Development Committees (VDCs) were 
selected using probability proportional to size for the second stage with 5 VDCs per 
district. For the third stage, three rural wards were selected from each VDC using 
probability proportional to size to get a total of 240 wards. For the last stage, within each 
ward, 17 households with children under five years were randomly selected to obtain a 
total sample of 4,080 households. Within each household, one child less than five years 
of age was randomly selected as the index child for the survey and, if available, one child 
having the same biological mother as the index child was selected as the non-index child.  
Interviews were conducted with the mother of the index child and with the father 
of the index child or when unavailable, another male household decision-maker or a 
female, if no males resided in the household. In this study, our sample consisted of 
households who had complete information on women’s and men’s bargaining domains 
(n=2,166) for children aged 0-59 months. Out of this sample, 1052 households had the 
father of the index child as the male respondent. Information was collected on child 
health and care, infant and young child feeding knowledge and practices, household food 
security, maternal diet diversity, women’s empowerment, men’s empowerment, 
information access, maternal health, water sanitation and hygiene, and child and maternal 
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anthropometry and hemoglobin. Anthropometric measurements were age-appropriate 
with children aged 0-23 months measured using supine length, while for children aged 
24-59 months standing height was measured in duplicates by trained enumerators using 
standardized length boards (ShorrBoard produced by Weight and Measure LLC).35 
Outcome Variables 
Child height-for-age standard deviation z-scores (HAZ) based on the World 
Health Organization (WHO) growth standards were used.36  
Explanatory Variables 
Women’s bargaining power was measured in four ways: 1) ownership and control 
of household assets, 2) social participation, 3) workload, and 4) household decision-
making control. The variables for the specific domains were constructed as follows:  
We used ten household assets to form an additive scale to measure ownership and 
control of assets. The ten assets used were: 1) house and other structures, 2) large 
consumer durables (e.g., fridge, TV, sofa), 3) small consumer durables (e.g., radio, 
cookware), 4) mobile phone, 5) transportation (motorized or non-motorized), 6) 
agricultural land, 7) non-agricultural land, 8) non-mechanized farm equipment, 9) large 
livestock, and 10) small livestock. If the household had a particular asset, we first 
assessed if the respondent solely or jointly owned that specific asset. If a respondent 
solely or jointly owned an asset, we also considered if s/he was involved in sole or joint 
decision-making about selling or renting of that asset.25,37 For each asset, a value of 1 was 
assigned if the respondent solely or jointly owned that asset and was also involved in sole 
or joint decision-making about selling or renting of that asset. Since our study focus is on 
intra-household bargaining, which relates to the relative socioeconomic position, we 
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measured sole or joint ownership of assets as opposed to only sole ownership, which 
would indicate total autonomy. Values for all assets were summed to obtain a total score 
ranging from 0-10.  
Social participation for women and men was based on active group membership 
in different community-based groups, where the participant regularly attended meetings, 
engaged in discussions and/or volunteered.25,37 Participation in groups such as 
agricultural groups, water user’s, land/forest users’, credit or microfinance, mutual help 
or insurance group, trade or business association, civic groups, religious groups, mother’s 
group or other women’s groups was measured. A value of 1 was assigned for each group 
that a respondent participated. The total number of groups in which the respondent 
participated was calculated. As a majority of those with group membership participated 
in one group, we created a binary variable to indicate whether or not the respondent 
participated in any community group.  
Workload domain measured the total time spent by the respondent on work 
activities in a 24-hour period.25,37 Information was collected on all productive activities 
(work/ employment, agriculture activities, domestic work, and care for children/ 
adults/elders) and personal activities (sleeping and resting, personal care, time spent of 
leisure activities, and social and/or religious activities). To determine the workload 
measure, total time spent on domestic work, care for children and elders, wage work or 
employment, and subsistence activities such as farming and livestock, and schoolwork 
was calculated, based on the respondent’s previous 24-hour recall.   
Household decision-making control was measured based on respondent’s sole or 
joint household decision-making on household economy, health of the family and self, 
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and domestic violence and mobility.38 Since our focus was on intra-household 
bargaining, which relates to the relative socioeconomic position, we measured sole or 
joint decision-making as opposed to sole decision-making power, which would indicate 
total autonomy. The eight decisions used to create this measure were: 1) major household 
expenditures such as on refrigerator or TV, 2) minor household expenditures such as food 
for daily consumption or other household necessities, 3) use of family planning products, 
4) respondent’s health and nutrition, 5) children’s healthcare, 6) child feeding, 7) how to 
keep from domestic violence, and 8) mobility to go to a relative or friend’s house. Men’s 
decision-making did not include items on domestic violence and mobility, therefore only 
six items were considered for men’s decision-making. For each joint decision, we also 
assessed the extent of decision-making control. The response scale for the extent to which 
the respondent feels s/he can contribute to the joint decision was measured as 1= not at 
all, 2= small extent, 3= some extent, 4= to a large extent.  For each type of decision, a 
person was adequate if s/he was the sole decision-maker, or for joint decision-making, if 
the respondent felt s/he can be involved at least to some extent of decision-making. We 
then calculated the proportion of a respondent’s involvement in sole or joint decision-
making. All decisions made in the household were computed for the denominator and a 
total of sole or joint decisions made served as the numerator.  
Household food insecurity was measured using the Household Food Insecurity 
Access Scale (HFIAS).39 The mean HFIAS score in our sample was skewed towards the 
lower end of the score range. Using linear transformation for the scale score would be 
inappropriate for mediation analysis to compute the product of coefficients and determine 
the related direct and indirect effects. We, therefore, used the HFIAS prevalence 
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categories as a continuous variable with a score ranging from 1 (food secure) to 4 
(severely food insecure). To ensure our interpretation and inference of the results would 
not differ, we first analyzed the relationship between food insecurity prevalence as a 
categorical variable and the outcome child HAZ (Reference category 1;β= -0.120, 
p=0.040 for score 2; β = -0.0783, p=0.279 for score 3; β =-0.280, p=0.058 for score 4). 
We then tested the relationship between food insecurity prevalence as a continuous 
category and HAZ (β= -0.0507, p=0.022). Both methods showed an overall negative 
relationship between food insecurity and child nutrition. We also separately assessed food 
insecurity as a continuous outcome variable and as a categorical variable using the 
ordered logit model with women’s and men’s bargaining domains as the explanatory 
variables. The interpretation of the relationship between bargaining domains and food 
insecurity did not differ using continuous versus categorical variable. Hence, we used the 
HFIAS prevalence as a continuous variable.  
We considered certain maternal, child, and socioeconomic characteristics as 
potential confounders based on prior evidence suggesting an association with child HAZ, 
food insecurity, and/or bargaining power. For example, higher maternal education has 
been shown to be associated with higher HAZ, better food security, and bargaining 
power.40,41 Household wealth can affect food and health resources, which could influence 
child HAZ. Agro-ecological areas were used to control for geographic differences in 
feeding practices and other cultural practices. The covariates used in all multivariable 
analyses were child age (months), child gender, maternal age (years), maternal height 
(centimeters), maternal education (years of formal schooling), number of children under 
5 years living in the household, household wealth (sum of number of small durable 
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assets, large assets, and agricultural assets), if the respondent was in Suaahara control or 
intervention group, and agro-ecological zone of the household (terai, hills, mountains). In 
all analyses, we accounted for village development committee level clustering (80 
clusters) as random effects. 
Statistical Analysis 
All analyses were conducted in Stata SE version 14. Descriptive statistics were 
obtained through proportions, or means and standard deviation, as relevant to the 
variables. Bivariate relationship with child HAZ using simple linear regression was 
assessed for each of the main explanatory variables of bargaining power, food insecurity, 
and control variables. To describe the household decision-making control between 
spouses, we calculated percent agreement and kappa to understand whether there was 
agreement on who made specific household decisions. We assessed agreement on five 
household decisions: 1) major household expenditure, 2) minor household expenditure, 3) 
family planning decisions, 4) decisions regarding child’s health, and 5) decision 
regarding child feeding. Agreement was assessed using seven categories: 1) mother of 
child solely takes the decision, 2) father of child solely takes the decision, 3) spouses 
jointly take the decision, 4) spouses and another person involved in decision-making, 5) 
mother and another person decides, 6) father and another person decides, and 7) only 
others decide. The sample size for each decision differed as it was based on whether or 
not both men and women had data on a particular decision and if a particular decision 
was made in a household. The response categories for persons involved in decision-
making would only allow comparing joint decision between spouses. For example, if a 
mother responded that spouse makes a particular decision, she would be referring to the 
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father of the index child. If a male member who is not the spouse of the mother 
responded to a question that spouse makes a particular decision; he would not be 
referring to the mother of the index child. Hence, the percent agreement was only 
assessed between spouses.  
We used multilevel modeling to assess the relationship between HAZ and 
women’s bargaining power, men’s bargaining power, women’s and men’s bargaining 
power together, and the interaction between women’s and men’s bargaining power to test 
if the relationship between women’s bargaining power and HAZ is dependent on men’s 
bargaining power. We used generalized structural equation (GSEM) modeling with 
household food insecurity as the mediator (Figure 4.2). Using GSEM, we employed this 
product-of-coefficients method where two regression models were analyzed- one model 
where child HAZ was regressed on the mediator (household food insecurity), main 
explanatory variables of bargaining power for women and/or men, and covariates, and 
another model where the mediator (household food insecurity) was regressed on the main 
explanatory bargaining variables and covariates. The indirect effect was obtained as a 
product of each bargaining domain coefficient on the mediator and the mediator 
coefficient on the outcome. The coefficient between each of the bargaining domains and 
child HAZ was the direct effect. 
We met the following three assumptions for the recursive path analysis. First, we 
found no exposure-mediator interaction by testing for interaction between each of the 
women’s bargaining domains and household food insecurity, and except for men’s 
workload, there were no significant interactions between men’s bargaining domains and 
food insecurity. Based on the interaction estimates, the effect of food insecurity on men’s 
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average workload was close to zero (-0.049); hence, men’s workload was included in the 
mediation analysis. Second, we included potential covariates in all regression analyses to 
account for confounding between bargaining power and household food insecurity, 
bargaining power and child HAZ, and food insecurity and child HAZ based on previous 
evidence.42,41,43 Third, we used path analysis with cross-sectional data and justified no 
reverse causality based on theory related to women’s empowerment that suggests women 
with greater access to resources and decision-making control are more likely to leverage 
their position for better health and nutrition outcomes17,44–46 and previous research that 
highlights this relationship.15,9,8 
In the mediation analysis, for the legs of the paths that were significant, the 
indirect effect was calculated as the product of the individual coefficients of each leg 
leading to the mediator and then to the outcome using the nlcom procedure to obtain 
appropriate test statistics, standard errors, and significance levels. The indirect effect was 
compared to the total effect, i.e., the sum of indirect effect and direct effect to assess the 
relative contribution of the indirect path. All continuous variables were standardized. To 
understand if there would be any difference in findings between men’s sample that only 
included the spouse of the mother as compared to the entire male respondent sample, we 
also analyzed models with the sample that only included bargaining information on the 
father of the index child, n=1052. The results for this analysis did not differ from the 
main analysis and are therefore not presented further, but specific relevant findings are 
noted in the discussion section.  
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RESULTS 
The mean child HAZ score was -1.71 (Table 4.4). Women’s mean asset 
ownership and control score was 2.56, while for men it was 5.32. About 17% of women 
and men actively participated in at least one community group. Women solely or jointly 
participated in 74% of the eight household decisions while men solely or jointly 
participated in about 70% of the six household decisions. Women’s mean time allocation 
for work was 11.1 hour in a day, while men worked 8.20 hours in a day.  
Bivariate analysis showed that women’s asset ownership and control slightly 
above significance level (0.056) and was positively associated with HAZ, while 
household decision-making control and workload were significantly associated with 
lower HAZ (Table 4.5). Bivariate relationship between women’s social participation and 
child HAZ was not significant. Men’s ownership and control of assets was not associated 
with HAZ.  Men’s social participation was associated with significantly higher HAZ, 
while household decision-making had a significant negative association with HAZ. 
Men’s workload and child HAZ did not have a significant association. 
Agreement between spouses on who makes household decisions was generally 
low as indicated by low percent agreement and related kappa (Table 4.6).  Percent 
agreement between spouses was lowest for decisions regarding child health and highest 
for major household expenditure. Only 33.87% of the couples agreed on their sole or 
joint role in child health decision-making while 51.06% agreed on their decision-making 
control about major household expenditures.  
We used four models for the multi-level regression analysis to explain the 
association of men’s and women’s bargaining power and child HAZ (Table 4.7). In 
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model 1, which tested for relationships between the four domains of women’s bargaining 
power and HAZ, one standard deviation (SD) higher workload was significantly 
associated with 0.05 SD lower HAZ. Women’s ownership and control of assets was not 
significantly associated with HAZ, while household decision-making was negatively 
related to HAZ with P-value slightly above significance level (P=0.058). In model 2, 
which tested for relationships between the same domains of men’s bargaining power and 
HAZ, higher workload and ownership and control of assets were not significantly 
associated with HAZ. However, men’s social participation was associated with 0.155 SD 
higher HAZ and household decision-making was associated with 0.039 lower HAZ 
(P=0.066). In model 3, the relationship between men and women’s bargaining power 
together and child HAZ was tested.  Women’s ownership and control of assets was 
positively associated with child HAZ, while workload was negatively related to child 
HAZ. Men’s social participation was positively associated with child HAZ. Women’s 
and men’s household decision-making control was negatively associated child HAZ, but 
at P-value less than 0.1. There were no significant interactions between any of the men’s 
and women’s bargaining domains (model 4) indicating that the relationship between 
maternal bargaining power and child HAZ was not moderated by men’s bargaining 
power.  
Results from mediation analysis are presented in Table 4.8. Model 5 represents 
testing food insecurity as a mediator between women’s bargaining domains and HAZ. 
Women’s ownership and control assets had a significant, positive, direct effect on child 
HAZ. Ownership and control of assets was also associated with lower food insecurity 
(leg 1, model 5), and in turn, food insecurity was negatively associated with child HAZ 
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(leg 2, model 5). This indirect path contributed to 5.92% of the total effect (Table 4.9). 
Women’s workload had a direct, negative relationship, but food insecurity did not 
mediate the relationship between workload and HAZ. Household decision-making had a 
borderline significant (P=0.071) direct negative relationship with child HAZ. Food 
insecurity mediated the relationship between household decision-making and child HAZ 
such that household decision-making was positively associated with food insecurity, 
which in turn was negatively associated with child HAZ, and contributed to 7.76% of the 
total effect (Table 4.9). Women’s social participation did not have a direct or indirect 
relationship with child HAZ.  
Model 6 presents the path analysis between men’s bargaining power and child 
HAZ. Men’s social participation was associated lower food insecurity (leg 1, model 6), 
which was subsequently negatively related to HAZ (leg 2, model 6); this indirect path 
accounted for 4.15% of the total effect. Other domains did not have a direct or indirect 
significant relationship with HAZ or food insecurity.  
Model 7 shows the results for testing food insecurity as a mediator with women’s 
and men’s bargaining domains together. Women’s asset ownership and control was 
significantly associated with lower food insecurity, which in turn associated with lower 
child HAZ. This relationship mediated 3.88% of the total effect. Ownership of assets and 
control also had a significant direct relationship with child HAZ. Women’s decision-
making control was positively associated with food insecurity, which in turn was 
negatively associated with HAZ, accounting for 7.71% of the total effect. Men’s social 
participation also had a significant and positive direct relationship with child HAZ.  
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In model 7, men’s social participation was negatively associated with food insecurity, 
which, in turn, was negatively related to child HAZ, accounting for 3.71% of the total 
effect.  
DISCUSSION 
We examined the men’s and women’s bargaining domains with child nutritional 
status and found that distinct domains of men’s and women’s bargaining relate to child 
nutritional status and mediate the relationship through food insecurity. Women’s 
ownership and control of asset had a positive relationship and workload had a negative 
relationship with child HAZ. Food insecurity mediated the relationship between women’s 
ownership and control of assets. Men’s social participation was related to higher HAZ 
score and food insecurity mediated this relationship.  
The positive relationship between women’s ownership and asset control suggests 
the importance of women’s economic control, which is consistent with the research 
examining bargaining power and child nutrition.26,47,48 Women’s bargaining power 
through her assets is related to food allocation among adults.40 Higher access to food may 
therefore also translate to better food allocation in terms of acquisition, dietary quantity, 
and quality for the child. Women’s ownership and control of assets may indicate better 
resource allocation within the household and is also shown to be related to greater 
expenditure on child well-being such as health and schooling 10,28,46, thereby likely 
affecting the long-term nutritional status of children. Men’s ownership and control of 
assets was not related to child nutrition directly or through food insecurity. In the South 
Asian context, men are more likely to own and control household assets than women. A 
non-significant finding may suggest the use of asset ownership and control for other 
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varied purposes in the household, which may not directly relate to child nutrition. The 
difference in findings between women’s economic control as compared to men’s 
economic control further highlights that women’s individual access to resources is critical 
regardless of the husband’s economic control and household wealth as it underscores that 
women as compared to men may likely allocate more of their resources to child health 
and nutrition.  
For the mediation analysis, in models with men’s bargaining power for only the 
spouse sample, i.e., index child’s father (results not shown), men’s asset ownership had a 
significant negative association with food insecurity, but food insecurity, though 
negatively related, was not significantly associated with HAZ. The difference in the 
results between the all-male sample and male ‘spouse only’ sample suggests that the 
father of index children may be a more productive household member for income 
generation or agricultural production affecting food insecurity as compared to other male 
members of the household, especially older men, who may not be as actively involved in 
income generation. The insignificant findings between food insecurity and HAZ in 
‘spouse only’ analysis suggest the effect was likely not captured due to the reduction in 
overall sample size of the model from 2,164 for all male models versus 1,052 for ‘spouse 
only’ models.  
Women’s workload was associated with lower HAZ in our sample. Prior studies 
on women’s workload have often focused on outside employment and have shown that it 
is negatively related to HAZ.49 Women’s satisfaction with their available leisure time is 
shown to be positively associated with length-for-age z-scores in Nepal.25 Women’s 
workload influences the time she has available to spend with her child and the quality of 
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child care she can provide, which may be reflected in poor feeding, hygiene practices, 
and care practices which could, in turn, affect child nutritional status.13,50 Negative 
association between workload and HAZ also emphasizes the burden of time poverty 
where women in resource-poor settings disproportionately bear the weight of domestic 
work and being involved in productive markets to make ends meet. To understand how 
the relationship between women’s workload and child HAZ may differ based on early 
childhood and preschool years, we also analyzed the relationship in children 0-23 months 
and 24-59 months separately (results not shown). Workload was not significantly related 
to children aged 0-23 months, but was negatively associated in children aged 24-59 
months.  Women may face excess workload burden during sensitive phases such as 
pregnancy and lactation 51,52, causing distress 53, which could adversely affect child 
growth in-utero and during early childhood, leading to poor long-term nutritional status 
and may be more prominently reflected in children 3-5 years with lower HAZ due to 
cumulative disadvantage. Men’s workload was not significantly related to HAZ, which 
suggests that women’s workload may contribute more to HAZ than men’s workload 
possibly due to the traditional role of women in caring for children, thus also highlighting 
the gendered structure of women’s time allocation.50 Further examination is needed to 
understand specific aspects of time allocation and workload to identify where the biggest 
tradeoffs are between work and child care to gain a greater understanding of the workload 
domain. 
Men’s social participation, i.e. active group membership, was a significant 
predictor of child HAZ and was also related to household food insecurity. While there is 
limited information on understanding the mechanism of how the characteristics of social 
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networks may relate to health in men, networks may facilitate greater access to new 
knowledge and skills, which could improve health and nutrition outcomes. For example, 
a study in India found that men’s social capital, as measured by the size of the network, 
was positively related to women attending antenatal care services.54 Involvement in social 
groups may also present more opportunities to participate in income generating activities 
such as cash-based incentives or through improved agricultural practices, which can 
reduce household financial burden, improve food security, and increase child HAZ.55,56 
The positive association between men’s social participation and child HAZ was also seen 
in the ‘spouse only’ model. Men’s bargaining power in child nutrition is understudied, 
and our findings suggest that more research is needed to examine and evaluate structural 
and cognitive social capital and social support to elucidate how men’s social domains of 
bargaining affect child nutritional status. 
Women’s social participation was not associated directly or indirectly with HAZ. 
Women’s group participation has been shown to be related to child nutrition outcomes 
through multiple mechanisms such as increasing income and improving agricultural 
practices to promote increased food production diversity, thereby contributing to 
improved food security.57 Prior studies also suggest that linkages from women’s social 
participation to child nutrition may be more complex and possibly dependent on different 
facets of social capital and social support than just social participation.58,59 Networks 
characteristics such as the size of the network or education of the network members may 
be more important for predicting child nutrition than participation alone.59 Characteristics 
of women-based organizations such as collective maturity of the participants and their 
ability over-time to make decisions as a collective entity is related to reduction in the 
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prevalence of stunting60, which suggests that rigorous longitudinal evaluation would 
serve well to expound the relationship between women’s social participation and child 
HAZ, by accounting for the consistency and duration of social participation, generation 
of social capital, and concurrently understanding the process of empowerment.  
The positive relationship between household decision-making for women with 
food insecurity and direct negative relationship with child HAZ were unexpected 
findings. With a few exceptions, empowerment literature generally suggests that 
women’s decision-making is positively associated with child nutritional status.9,15,61,62 
Our unexpected results may perhaps be related to the significant disagreement about 
decision-making between spouses in our sample. This disagreement may be a result of 
socially desirable responses to highlight higher personal bargaining power than the 
spouse. We analyzed if disagreement on individual household decisions between spouses 
on who makes the decisions was associated with overall decision-making control (results 
not shown). We found that disagreement in decisions related to expenditure was 
associated with higher decision-making control in women, while disagreement in child 
health and feeding decisions was associated with higher decision-making control in men. 
This suggests that women and men may overestimate their role in decision-making in 
different aspects, which may not reflect their true decision-making control. The 
unexpected findings between food insecurity and household decision-making may be 
related to the differential estimation of decision-making control in women and men. 
Disagreement can also result from differential personal cognition and interpretation of 
questions between men and women.63 We could not assess how responses may differ 
between spouses and other influential men in the household due to the way responses 
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categories were set-up. Understanding how other influential household males may 
respond to questions related to household decision-making in comparison to the mother 
of the child would provide further insights into the dynamics of gendered intra-household 
bargaining. It is also likely that household decision-making may be more immediately 
associated with relative proximal factors such as health-seeking behavior, rather than 
HAZ, a measure of chronic undernutrition. Future research is needed to understand any 
contextual factors, which may influence women’s decision-making control and its effects 
on child HAZ.  
In our sample, the relationship between women’s bargaining power and child 
nutrition was not moderated by men’s bargaining power. These findings suggest that 
despite the patriarchal context in South Asia, women’s bargaining power domains may 
operate independently from men’s bargaining power for child HAZ. Lack of a 
moderating effect by men’s bargaining power also highlights the importance of women’s 
bargaining power in child health and nutrition in terms of individual resource allocation 
and decision-making as being crucial regardless of poverty or the gendered social 
context. 
Our study is one of the first that has compared women’s and men’s bargaining 
domains and assessed its relationship to child nutritional status. Our study adds to the 
current evidence on men’s role on child nutrition that has focused either on interventions 
involving only men or only examined couples’ decision-making in other health topics 
such as family planning and health-seeking behavior.64,65 Analysis on women’s 
empowerment in agriculture analysis conducted on the Suaahara study sample showed 
overall gender disparities in empowerment in agriculture negatively relate to child 
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HAZ.25,37 Our study adds to this existing research by providing further in-depth 
understanding of the specific bargaining domains including household decision-making 
for women and men that are likely to be important for child nutrition. We also examined 
food security as a mechanism of how bargaining relates to HAZ. Understanding the role 
of food insecurity and how that relates to women’s status and child nutrition is crucial to 
inform nutrition-sensitive strategies focusing on gender, nutrition, and agriculture.  
The cross-sectional nature of our analysis does not allow us to make causal 
inferences. High disagreement between spouses on who makes household decisions may 
suggest that social desirability or differences in cognition between women and men about 
decision-making related questions may have affected their responses. We did not have 
information on domestic violence experiences of women, which is shown to be a 
predictor of food insecurity and child nutrition, and is an important domain of household 
bargaining.66,67 Future studies should consider including this domain along with other 
domains to assess women’s bargaining and its relationship with child nutrition.  
Our study has several future research and program implications. Our analysis 
shows that men’s role in the household is important and future studies should evaluate 
how men’s bargaining power influences child nutrition in varied contexts to enhance our 
understanding of household dynamics and child nutrition, to develop a strong evidence 
base, and to inform programs and interventions. Studies should also focus on 
understanding other social domains such as social capital or social support, and its effect 
on child nutrition. Intervention strategies incorporating men’s social participation can be 
designed to actively engage men in improving their knowledge, thereby improving their 
capacity to provide support to their wives during pregnancy, childbirth, and lactation to 
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positively contribute to improving child nutrition efforts. Considering that men’s social 
participation was significant for food insecurity, poverty alleviation and health programs 
could be designed to include men and women to increase men’s engagement with health 
and nutrition issues. Investments should be made in programs that can combine social 
participation and greater access to economic resources to effectively target different 
domains of women’s bargaining power simultaneously. Microcredit programs have found 
success in this regard, but future programs could be more tailored toward a particular 
context and could involve other members of the household. Programs can be tailored to 
make women and men important stakeholders in improving not only child nutrition, but 
also in promoting a holistic, enabling environment for better child care and nutrition.  
Nutrition-sensitive approaches focusing on improving women’s social and 
economic empowerment may prove beneficial in improving household food security and 
child health. More context-specific strategies could be applied to improve asset 
ownership and improve women’s participation in income generating activities. Since 
women’s status is determined by the sociocultural context, efforts should also be made to 
address underlying issues such as low rates of education and poor adolescent health to 
empower women before marriage and childbearing. Gendered intra-household bargaining 
plays an important role in determining child nutrition, therefore, interventions should 
focus on engaging men and women of the household with context-specific, innovative 
strategies to reduce child undernutrition.  
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Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics of child, family, and household characteristics for 
children aged 0-59 months in Suaahara study in Nepal, (n=2,166)1 
Variable Mean (SD) or 
% 
Range 
Child Characteristics    
Child age (months) 27.1 (16.61) 0-59.99 
Child gender (female) 46.72 - 
Child HAZ -1.71 (1.25) -5, - 4 
Women’s Intra-household Bargaining 
Domains 
  
Ownership and control of assets 2.56 (2.14) 0-9 
Social participation (active group 
membership score) 
0.23 (0.61) 0-7 
Social participation (active group 
membership yes/no) 
16.62 - 
Time allocated to work/ 24 hours 11.1 (3.03) - 
Proportion of household decision-making 73.9 (20.8) 0-100 
Men’s Intra-household Bargaining Domains   
Ownership and control of assets 5.32 (2.31) 0-10 
Social participation (active group 
membership score) 
0.247 (0.64) 0-5 
Social participation (active group 
membership yes/no) 
16.81 - 
Time allocated to work/ 24 hours 8.20 (3.95) - 
Proportion of household decision-making 69.5 (24.86) 0-100 
Maternal age (years) 26.72 (6.24) 15-52 
Maternal height (cm) 151.7 (5.64) 133-186.1 
Maternal years of schooling 4.61 (4.49) 0-15 
Household Characteristics   
Household food insecurity   
  Food secure 74.56 - 
  Mildly food insecure 15.24 - 
  Moderately food insecure 8.40 - 
  Severely food insecure 1.80 - 
Children under 5 years 1.38 (0.62) 1-5 
Household wealth (assets) 6.18 (3.75) 0-23 
Agro-ecological area 
Mountain 
Hills 
Terai 
 
27.29 
44.37 
28.35 
 
- 
- 
- 
1 Sample size is based on bargaining power data available on all domains for women and men 
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Table 4.5: Bivariate associations of child, family, and household characteristics with 
child HAZ in children 0-59 months in Suaahara study in Nepal, (n=2,166) 
Variable 
 
 
Child HAZ 
 
 
p-value  
Child Characteristics    
Child age (years) -0.0218 <0.001 
Child gender (female) 0.0885 0.100 
Women’s Intra-household Bargaining 
Domains  
  
   Ownership and control of assets 0.0240 0.056 
Social participation (active group 
membership yes/no) 
0.00614 0.932 
Time allocated to work/ 24 hours -0.0422 <0.001 
Proportion of Household decision-making -0.390 0.003 
Men’s Intra-household Bargaining Domains    
   Ownership and control of assets -0.0122 0.290 
Social participation (active group 
membership yes/no) 
0.324 <0.001 
Time allocated to work/ 24 hours 0.00838 0.217 
Proportion of Household decision-making -0.343 0.001 
Maternal Characteristics  
 
 
Maternal age (years) -0.0229 
.0570671 
<0.001 
Maternal height (cm) 0.0571 <0.001 
Maternal years of schooling 0.0693 <0.001 
Household Characteristics   
Household Food Insecurity   
  Food Secure Reference  
 
  Mildly food insecure -0.372 <0.001 
<0. 
  Moderately food insecure -0.512 <0.001 
  Severely Food insecure -0.716 <0.001 
Children under 5 years -0.161 
.0669708 
<0.001 
Household wealth (assets) 0.0670 <0.001 
Agro-ecological area 
Mountain 
Hills 
Terai 
 
0.485 
0.478 
 
       <0.001 
       <0.001 
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Table 4.6: Agreement on household decision-making between spouses 
Decision Percent 
Agreement 
Kappa n 
Major household expenditure 51.06 0.2180 472 
Minor household expenditure  42.00 0.2008 1188 
Family planning decisions 50.38 0.0856 788 
Decisions regarding child 
health 
33.87 0.0756 1190 
Decisions regarding child 
feeding 
45.97 0.0593 1190 
Note: All Kappa statistic values significant at P<0.001 
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Table 4.7: Multilevel regression analysis explaining the relationship of men’s and 
women’s bargaining domain with child HAZ (n=2,164) 
Bargaining Domains Women’s 
Bargaining 
Men’s 
Bargaining  
Men’s and 
Women’s  
Bargaining 
Together  
Interaction 
with men’s 
bargaining  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Women’s Domains     
Ownership 
& Control 
of assets 
0.0388 
(P=0.128) 
- 0.0514 
(P=0.047) 
0.0227 
(P=0.296) 
 
Social 
Participation 
0.00660 
(P=0.903) 
- -0.00601 
(P=0.912) 
-0.0233 
(P=0.848) 
Workload -0.0508 
(P=0.013) 
 
 
- -0.0522 
(P=0.011) 
 
-0.0109 
(P=0.553) 
Household 
Decision- 
Making 
-0.0457 
(P=0.058) 
- -0.0425 
(P=0.077) 
0.000898 
(P=0.964) 
 
Men’s Domains 
    
Ownership 
& Control 
of assets 
- -0.0255 
(P=0.233) 
-0.0308 
(P=0.154) 
- 
Social 
Participation 
- 0.155 
(0.003) 
0.156 
(P=0.003) 
- 
Workload - -0.000178 
(0.993) 
0.00483 
(P=0.805) 
- 
Household 
Decision- 
Making 
- -0.0391 
(P=0.066) 
-0.0412 
(P=0.053) 
- 
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Table 4.8: Path coefficients for mediation analysis linking bargaining domains, food insecurity, and child HAZ (n=2,164) 
Bargaining 
Domains 
Women’s Bargaining 
Model 5 
Men’s Bargaining 
Model 6 
Women’s and men’s bargaining together 
Model 7 
Women’s  
Domains 
Leg 1 Leg 2 Direct Leg 1 Leg 2 Direct Leg 1 Leg 2 Direct 
Ownership 
& Control 
of assets 
-0.0628 
(P=0.021) 
-0.0519 
(P=0.015) 
0.0518 
(P=0.044) 
- - - -0.0565 
(P=0.037) 
-0.0495 
(P=0.019) 
0.0641 
(P=0.020) 
Social 
Participation 
-0.0612 
(P=0.273) 
-0.0519 
(P=0.015) 
-0.00857 
(P=0.867) 
- - - -0.0560 
(P=0.311) 
-0.0495 
(P=0.019) 
-0.0236 
(P=0.647) 
Workload -0.00819 
(P=0.723) 
-0.0519 
(P=0.015) 
-0.0535 
(P=0.014) 
- - - -0.00396 
(P=0.865) 
-0.0495 
(P=0.019) 
-0.0547 
(P=0.011) 
Household 
Decision- 
Making 
0.0750 
(P=0.002) 
-0.0519 
(P=0.015) 
-0.0462 
(P=0.071) 
- - - 0.0728 
(P=0.002) 
-0.0495 
(P=0.019) 
-0.0431 
(P=0.088) 
 
Men’s 
Domains 
         
Ownership 
& Control 
of assets 
- - - -0.0353 
(P=0.063) 
-0.0527 
(P=0.014) 
-0.0155 
(P=0.398) 
-0.0294 
(P=0.097) 
-0.0495 
(P=0.019) 
-0.0246 
(P=0.196) 
Social 
Participation 
- - - -0.131 
(P=0.002) 
-0.0527 
(P=0.014) 
0.159 
(P=0.001) 
-0.125 
(P=0.003) 
-0.0495 
(P=0.019) 
0.161 
(P=0.001) 
Workload - - - -0.0366 
(P=0.081) 
-0.0527 
(P=0.014) 
-0.00576 
(P=0.788) 
-0.0363 
(P=0.086) 
-0.0495 
(P=0.019) 
0.0000629 
(P=0.998) 
 
Household 
Decision- 
Making 
- - 
- 
0.0115 
(P=0.663) 
-0.0527 
(P=0.014) 
-0.0367 
(P=0.106) 
0.00877 
(P=0.735) 
-0.0495 
(P=0.019) 
-0.0411 
(P=0.062) 
Leg 1 denotes the relationship between bargaining domains and food insecurity, the first leg of the indirect path. 
Leg 2 denotes the relationship between food insecurity and child HAZ, the second leg of the indirect path. 
Direct denotes the direct path from bargaining domains and child HAZ. 
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Table 4.9: Contribution of significant indirect legs of paths linking specific bargaining domains, food insecurity,  
and child HAZ (n=2,164) 
Bargaining 
Domains 
Women’s Bargaining Men’s Bargaining Women’s and Men’s Bargaining  
 Indirect 
Effect 
(P-value) 
[% of total 
effect] 
Direct 
Effect 
(P-value) 
Total  
Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
(P-value) 
[% of total 
effect] 
Direct 
Effect 
(P-value) 
Total 
Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
(P-value) 
[% of 
total 
effect] 
Direct 
Effect 
(P-value) 
Total 
Effect 
Women’s 
Domains 
         
Ownership 
and Control 
of Assets 
0.00326 
(P=0.101) 
[5.92%] 
0.0518 
(P=0.044) 
0.0551 - - - 0.00280 
(P=0.132) 
[3.88%] 
0.0641 
(P=0.020) 
0.0721 
Household 
decision-
making 
-0.00389 
(P=0.035) 
[7.76%] 
-0.0462 
(P=0.071) 
-0.0501 - - - -0.00360 
(P=0.040) 
[7.71%] 
-0.0431 
(P=0.088) 
-0.0467 
Men’s 
domains 
         
Social 
Participation 
- -  0.00689 
(P=0.055) 
[4.15%] 
0.159 
(P=0.001) 
0.166 0.00620 
(P=0.069) 
[3.71%] 
0.161 
(P=0.001) 
0.167 
Indirect effect is the product of coefficients of leg 1 and leg 2 
Direct effect is the coefficient of the direct path 
Total effect is the sum of direct and indirect effects 
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    Figure 4.2: Path diagram for generalized structural equation modeling analysis
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CHAPTER 5 
 SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Summary of Findings 
 
 We conducted a quantitative analysis to understand the relationship between 
gendered intra-household bargaining power and child feeding and nutrition in rural 
Nepal. We assessed how bargaining power operates via two specific mechanisms: 1) 
exposure to IYCF information for understanding the role of women’s bargaining power 
in child feeding practices, and 2) household food insecurity to assess how women’s and 
men’s bargaining influences child nutritional status.  
Women’s social participation was positively associated with access to IYCF 
information, which was consequently associated with improved early initiation and 
dietary diversity. Higher men’s social participation was associated with lower food 
insecurity, and in turn with greater HAZ. Women’s ownership and control of assets was 
positively associated with child nutritional status, while men’s ownership and control of 
assets did not have a significant relationship with child HAZ. Women’s workload was 
negatively related to child HAZ thereby indicating possible trade-offs in time allocation 
and child care affecting child nutritional status. Men’s workload did not have a 
significant relationship with child HAZ. Women’s household decision-making was 
positively related to exclusive breastfeeding and early initiation, but was related to
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greater food insecurity. Men’s household decision-making was not related to food 
insecurity or child HAZ. 
 We found small but significant effects for the relationships between specific 
bargaining domains with IYCF practices and with child HAZ. Our results suggest that 
our measures capture intended constructs of intra-household bargaining power, i.e., our 
measures are non-random and have been used in previous research.22,23,130 The small 
magnitude of our coefficients may be due to the examination of more distal social factors 
related to child nutrition which may not capture the full extent of a given domain through 
a given measure or indicator. Significant findings in our research suggest that these 
bargaining domains need further examination and evaluation for research and 
programmatic purposes to understand their effect on child nutrition and to determine the 
usefulness of focusing on specific domains for interventions to improve women’s status 
in the household and the community. 
5.2 Contribution to Literature 
Our study contributes to the existing literature on gender and nutrition by 1) 
providing a comprehensive understanding of intra-household bargaining beyond 
commonly used measures of education and decision-making power, 2) contributing to 
address the research gap by examining mechanisms linking bargaining domains and child 
feeding and nutrition, and 3) providing evidence on the role of men in child nutrition, a 
topic that is considerably understudied.  
Evidence on women’s status and its relationship with child feeding and nutrition 
has largely focused on women’s autonomy or household decision-making.89,90,109,187,188 
Our study contributes to this existing evidence on women’s empowerment or bargaining 
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power using multiple domains of bargaining that capture the multifaceted nature of 
bargaining to include not only household decision-making, but also economic resources, 
social participation, workload, and time. Prior studies in Nepal based on the Suaahara 
project sample have focused on women’s empowerment in agriculture to include domains 
similar to our studies on asset ownership, social participation, and workload, which have 
shown association with specific domains and child nutritional status.22,23 Our research 
delves deeper to assess possible mechanisms that link the specific bargaining domains 
with IYCF practices and child nutritional status, thereby addressing the research gap in 
empowerment literature on understating specific linkages between bargaining and child 
nutrition.82,129 We also assess specific domains of men’s bargaining power, which 
provides a comprehensive analysis of overall household dynamics for men and women 
and suggests that incorporating multiple domains of household bargaining for men and 
women is critical to understand how gendered intra-household bargaining influences 
child nutrition beyond autonomy or household decision-making.   
 We studied men’s bargaining power and its relationship with child nutrition. We 
provide evidence on domains other than those commonly studied such as paternal 
education.20,189,190 The positive relationship between men’s social participation and child 
nutritional status suggests a possible increase in social capital to access knowledge or 
material resources obtained through group membership. The effect of men’s group 
membership on food insecurity provides evidence on a factor not previously studied and 
highlights the need for further research to understand how social participation influences 
food security for evidence-based programming that could engage men.  
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Our research suggests that exposure to ICYF is a critical precursor to gaining 
more knowledge and consequently improving IYCF practices. Having empirical evidence 
for this relationship is important because care practices are crucial in the first 24 months 
of life, not only for health, but also for overall growth and development.  
5.3 Limitations 
 We analyzed a cross-sectional dataset and therefore making causal inferences 
would not be applicable. Having follow-up data would have enabled us to understand any 
possible change in overall bargaining power over time due to changes in social context or 
through program or intervention for women and men. It would also have enabled us to 
understand how different bargaining domains may influence one another since there is 
reciprocity between domains. We also recognize that IYCF practices may relate to child 
nutritional status in our sample, and using longitudinal data would help rigorously test 
this relationship. We found that there was low agreement between spouses on their 
decision-making control, which could either be a result of differential cognition between 
men and women about the decisions or be due socially desirable responses provided to 
highlight greater personal autonomy.  
 Domestic violence is an important domain of household bargaining. Experiences 
with domestic violence are associated with distress and with low food 
insecurity.185,186,191,192 Understanding the effect of domestic violence experience would be 
crucial to not only understand its effect of child feeding and nutrition, but also to 
understand the interrelationship between other bargaining domains and domestic 
violence.  
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5.4 Implications for Future Research  
Future research could focus on improving certain measures of bargaining power, 
especially related to household decision-making, which yielded some unexpected 
findings in our research. Improvement in cognitive interviewing and improved data 
collection technique should be used to improve the understanding of questions and 
generate responses that truly reflect an individual’s control over decision-making in the 
household.  
 Future research can expand the measures for understanding the social dimension 
of women’s bargaining power to include measures of structural social capital including 
social network characteristics and duration of social participation. Frequency of group 
membership activities and duration could be measured against time and opportunity costs 
of participation in community groups versus the expected nutrition benefit through 
participation. Measures of cognitive social capital aspects of trust, reciprocity, and social 
support will further enable understanding the psychosocial aspects and cognitive 
processes, which could then be suitable to testing mechanisms related nutrition 
knowledge and awareness with regards to child feeding.  
 Food security is an important mediator between bargaining power and child 
nutritional status, and therefore related aspects such as intra-household food allocation 
should also be studied in relation to the mother and child when analyzing women’s 
bargaining power. Maternal and child diet diversity are related193 and may be related to 
food allocation; therefore understanding maternal food allocation is critical to account for 
the societal gender bias and traditional customs and norms, which may limit women’s 
access to food.  
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Men’s social participation was a significant predictor of child nutritional status 
and food security. Future studies could consider to routinely incorporating questions on 
men’s role in child nutrition beyond common measures of paternal education or 
wage/income. Specific information such as actual time spent on child care may provide 
valuable information regarding the workload domain for men and women and allow the 
assessment of paternal contribution is child health and nutrition. Information can also be 
obtained on men’s access, knowledge, and awareness of child feeding practices to 
understand the contribution of cognitive and access-related factors in child nutrition.  
Intra-household bargaining involves the relative social and economic position of a 
person within a household. In this research, we studied the role of men, but in South 
Asian settings it is fairly common for a household to comprise of other influential figures. 
Elderly females such as grandmothers of children within a household may play an 
important in determining a mother’s access to resources, her workload, and her 
knowledge. Information regarding understanding the relative influence of elderly women 
versus husband or men in the household could help gain important information of other 
factors influencing women’s bargaining power.   
Nepal has a high prevalence of migration that affects the household structure and 
dynamics.194 Migration is associated with changes in female employment, overall 
household income, social capital, and women’s workload,195,196 all of which can relate to 
women’s bargaining power. Future studies are needed to understand how bargaining 
power is influenced by different household structures due to migration, and how that 
relates to child nutrition.  
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When feasible, bargaining studies may be complemented with qualitative inquiry to 
understand the contextual factors that are likely to influence bargaining and provide a 
more nuanced view of the household dynamics of different family members.  
5.5 Implications for Programs and Policies 
 The current research underscores the importance of women’s bargaining in 
positively contributing to child nutrition, specifically highlighting that improvement 
women’s social participation, workload, and ownership and control of assets can 
significantly lead to more positive outcomes for feeding practices and nutritional status. 
Our study provides further evidence that working in the area of women-centered 
community groups offers significant benefits to women and children to improve social 
and economic aspects of bargaining power. More context-specific strategies could be 
applied to improve asset ownership and women’s participation in income generating 
activities based on local economies. 
 Programs supporting men’s engagement in child nutrition through social 
participation may prove beneficial and contribute to improved child nutrition. Programs 
targeting men often include agriculture or livelihood groups; these groups could be made 
more comprehensive by involving targeted meetings of child health and nutrition, to 
combine nutrition-sensitive and nutrition-specific approaches in one setting. Programs 
promoting higher men’s involvement in women’s health by increasing men’s 
participation in family planning and antenatal care visits, and involving men in child 
nutrition monitoring and care may also benefit by improving their knowledge and 
awareness regarding child nutrition. 
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 The importance of exposure to ICYF information, especially with regards to 
social participation domains, suggests that programs aiming to improve IYCF practices 
should ensure that appropriate, targeted IYCF messages are delivered to mothers through 
various delivery platforms. Improving women’s knowledge would not only require 
increasing women’s bargaining power, but also investing in strengthening health systems 
by improving availability and access to services and personnel, which can provide 
appropriate knowledge, services, and on-going to support to follow and maintain 
appropriate IYCF practices. Since improving access to IYCF information is critical, 
resources should be mobilized to improve messaging through mass media by national 
governments and non-governmental agencies, which has shown to improve IYCF 
knowledge and practices.170,197   
 Since women’s status is determined by the sociocultural context, efforts should 
also be made in addressing basic issues such as education and adolescent health through 
policy changes at the local and national level, to empower women possibly before 
marriage and childbearing to maximize the time available for optimal child health and 
nutrition. Given the strong momentum to address gender inequalities and reduce child 
undernutrition, programs and policies should focus on evidence-based strategies that aim 
to improve specific domains of intra-household bargaining to achieve targeted results in 
child nutrition.
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APPENDIX A 
EMPOWERMENT SECTION OF SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
Empowerment Module of the Suaahara Survey 
Relevant sections from the module are provided below.  
1. Economic domain module 
 
 
 
25 
Section B: Access to Capital 
 
Instructions: The purpose of this module is to get an idea about women's access to and control of capital/assets.  First 
answer 402.1 for all the assets listed from 1-16. Then return to the top of the table and then ask 402.2-402.6 for for only the 
assets which the household has. 
 
Read aloud:  Now we have some questions about your household’s access to capital/assets and who in the household has 
ownership of these resources? When we ask about ownership we mean the person who has the final say over that asset.  
 
Read aloud (before 402.3): When we ask about selling, giving away and renting these are different actions. Selling an item 
means to get rid of the asset in exchange for money. To give something away means to let someone permanently have the 
item free of charge. To mortgage or rent out means to temporarily allow someone use of the asset in exchange for a 
payment or service or some other return. For example, one household member may have the ability to let a friend rent the 
farm equipment, but not be able to make decisions about whether or not to sell that same item. 
 402 402.1 402.2 402.3 402.4 402.5 402.6 
S.N. Productive Capital 
Does anyone in 
your household 
currently have 
any _____? 
 
Yes ............... 1   
No ................ 2 
 
Who would 
you say 
owns most 
of the 
_____? 
 
 
(Code list 
below) 
Who can 
decide 
whether to 
sell _____ 
most of the 
time? 
 
(Code list 
below) 
Who can 
decide 
whether to 
give away 
_____most 
of the time? 
 
(Code list 
below) 
Who can 
decide to 
mortgage or 
rent out 
_____most of 
the time? 
 
(Code list 
below) 
Who 
contributes 
most to 
decisions 
regarding a 
new purchase 
of _____? 
 
(Code list 
below) 
1. Agricultural land  
      
2. Other land not used for agriculture 
      
3. Large livestock (e.g. oxen, cattle, buffalo, 
horse)       
4. Small livestock (goats, pigs, sheep, chickens, 
ducks, pigeons)       
5. Fish pond or fishing equipment 
      
6. Farm equipment (non-mechanized) 
      
7. Farm equipment (mechanized e.g. tractor) 
      
8. Non-farm business equipment (e.g. roti oven, 
sewing machine, solar panels, blacksmith 
equipment) 
      
9. House (and other structures) 
      
10. Large consumer durables (ex: fridge, TV, 
sofa)       
11. Small consumer durables (ex: radio, 
cookware)       
12. Mobile phone 
      
13. Transportation (motorized or not motorized, 
e.g. bicycle, motorcycle, car, horse cart)       
14.  Jewelry (silver) 
      
15. Jewelry (gold) 
      
16. Savings (in bank, at home, etc.) 
      
 
Code list for 402.2,  402.3, 402.4, 402.5 and 402.6 
01 = Self 
02 = Spouse 
03 = Self and spouse jointly 
04 = Other male household 
member 
05 = Other female household member 
06 = Self and other household member(s) 
07 = Spouse and other household member(s) 
08 = Self, spouse and other household member(s) 
09 = Someone (or group of people) outside  
 the household 
10 = Self and other outside people 
11 = Spouse and other outside people 
12 = Self, spouse and other outside people. 
 
 147 
2. Social domain module 
 
 
 
 
3. Workload domain module 
 
 
 
 
28 
Section E: Individual Leadership and Influence 
 
411 411.1 411.2 411.3 411.4 
S.N. 
 
Group Membership 
 
Is there a ____ in 
your community? 
 
Yes ......................... 1   
No .......................... 2 
   Next group 
Are you a member/active 
member of any ______? 
 
Yes member ............... 1   
Yes active  
member ....................... 2 
No ............................... 3 
411.4 
(Explain that "active 
member" means one 
who attends meetings, 
participates in 
discussions, volunteers, 
etc.) 
How much input 
do you have in 
making decisions 
in this ________? 
 
(Go to next 
group) 
 
(Code list below) 
Why are you 
not a member 
of ________? 
 
(Code list below) 
 
1.  Agricultural/livestock/fisheries producer group (including marketing groups) 	 	 	 	
2.  Water users’ group 	 	 	 	
3.  Land/forest users' groups 	 	 	 	
4.  Credit or microfinance group  	 	 	 	
5.  Mutual help or insurance group (including burial societies) 	 	 	 	
6.  Trade and business association  	 	 	 	
7.  Civic group (improving community) or charitable group (helping others)  	 	 	 	
8.  Religious group 	 	 	 	
9.  Mother's group 	 	 	 	
10.  Other women’s group (only if it does not fit into one of the other categories) 	 	 	 	
96 Other (Specify) __________ 	 	 	 	
 
Code list for 411.3  Code list for 411.4 
01 = No input 
02 = Input into very few decisions 
03 = Input into some decisions 
04 = Input into most decisions 
05 = Input into all decisions 
06 = Decision not made  
01 = Not interested 
02 = No time 
03 = Unable to raise entrance fees 
04 = Unable to raise reoccurring fees 
 
 
05 = Group meeting location not 
convenient 
06 = Family dispute/not allowed to join 
07 = Not allowed because of sex 
96 = Other (Specify)____________ 
 
S.N. Question Response Go to 
410 Do you feel comfortable speaking up in public to _______?  
410.1 Help decide on infrastructure (like small wells, 
roads, water supplies) to be built in your 
community? 
No, not at all comfortable .............................. 1 
Yes, but with a great deal of difficulty ........... 2 
Yes, but with a little difficulty ....................... 3 
Yes, mostly comfortable ................................ 4 
Yes, very comfortable .................................... 5 
 
410.2 Ensure proper payment of wages for public 
works or other similar programs? 
No, not at all comfortable .............................. 1 
Yes, but with a great deal of difficulty ........... 2 
Yes, but with a little difficulty ....................... 3 
Yes, mostly comfortable ................................ 4 
Yes, very comfortable .................................... 5 
 
410.3 Protest the misbehavior of authorities or 
elected officials? 
No, not at all comfortable .............................. 1 
Yes, but with a great deal of difficulty ........... 2 
Yes, but with a little difficulty ....................... 3 
Yes, mostly comfortable ................................ 4 
Yes, very comfortable .................................... 5 
 
 
 
30 
Section G: Time Allocation 
 
Read aloud: We are also interested in knowing about how you allocate your time for both work and leisure 
activities.   
S.N. Question Response Go to 
413 Was yesterday a typical day? Yes .......................................................... 1 
No  .......................................................... 2 
   416 
414 Was the day before a typical day? Yes .......................................................... 1 
No  .......................................................... 2 
   416 
415 If neither yesterday nor the day before were 
typical days, then why? 
Public holiday ......................................... 1 
Sick ......................................................... 2 
Sick child ................................................ 3 
Travel or away from home ..................... 4 
Visitors ................................................... 5 
Strike/Bandha ......................................... 6 
Other (Specify) ..................................... 96 
 
 
Instructions: If yesterday was a typical day ask the respondent about yesterday. If yesterday was atypical, but the day before 
typical, please ask the respondent to consider the day before's activities. If both days were atypical (answer for both 413 and 
414 is "No"), then please ask the respon ent to consider yesterday's activities.  
 
Please probe and account for activities by 30 minute time slots to get correct time allocation. Fill the log sheet (blank sheet) 
with the activities right from the time the respondent woke-up yesterday morning to the time the respondent went to 
sleep at night. First, use a blank sheet of paper to note what was done all day (24 hours including morning, day or night). 
Add up the number of minutes for each category and then make sure the columns each add up. All activities should add up to 
a total of 24 hours. 
 
Once you have added up all of the columns, if you do not reach 24 hours or 1440 minutes, please probe until you can fill in 
the missing minutes. 
 
Read aloud: Please describe all the time you gave to work and leisure activities you engaged in, since the time you woke up 
yesterday (or day before, where applicable). Please include time for traveling and commuting as part of the time for a given 
activity. 
416 Activities 
Early Morning 
(4am -8am) 
(Total 240 
minutes) 
Mid Morning 
(8am-12pm) 
(Total 240 
minutes) 
Afternoon 
(12pm-4pm) 
(Total 240 
minutes) 
Evening 
(4pm-8pm) 
(Total 240 
minutes) 
Night 
(8pm-4am) 
(Total 480 
minutes) 
1 Sleeping and resting 
     
2 Personal care 
(eating/drinking/hygiene)      
3 School (also homework) 
     
4 Work as employed for others 
     
5 Work as self employed 
     
6 Farming/livestock/fishing 
     
7 Domestic work  
(shopping/getting service, 
cooking, weaving, sewing) 
     
8 Care for children/adults/elderly 
     
9 Leisure (e.g., watching T.V./ 
listening to radio/reading/ 
roaming around/playing/talking 
on phone) 
     
10 Social and religious activities  
     
96 Other (Specify) ____________ 
     
 Total Time 
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4.Household decision-making control module 
 
 
 
 
29 
Section F: Decision-Making 
 
Instructions: Please ensure that the respondent understand these decision making concept by repeating 
definitions, explaining, and giving example as often as needed.  Also, if the household does not take part in the 
mentioned activity, then write '95' and skip to next activity. 
 
Read aloud: Now I would like some information about decision making in your household.  Please remember 
that when we ask who has the ability to make a decision about something it is the person who has the very 
imp rtant/primary say and not just some e involved in discussions about that topic. We are interested in 
knowing who has the key role in making decisions. 
 412 412.1 412.2 412.3 412.4 412.5 
Read aloud: I am going to give you some reasons 
why you act as you do in the activities I just 
mentioned.  You might have several reasons for 
doing what you do and there is no right or wrong 
answer.  Please tell me to what extent you agree 
with these statements. 
S.N. Activities 
Who normally takes 
the decision 
regarding _____? 
 
(If self, write 01 
and skip to next 
activity) 
 
(Code list below) 
To what extent 
can you make  
decisions 
regarding ____ if 
you want(ed) to? 
 
 
(Code list below) 
Regarding ___  
I do what I do  
partly because 
I will get in 
trouble if I do 
differently.  
 
(Code list 
below) 
Regarding 
_____ I do 
what I do so 
others don’t 
think poorly of 
me.  
 
(Code list 
below) 
Regarding 
_____ I do what 
I do because I 
personally think 
it is the right 
thing to do.  
 
(Code list 
below) 
1.  Agricultural production (what to grow and types of crops to plant)  	    
2.  Taking crops to the market (when and who will take crops to market)  	    
3.   Livestock raising  	    
4.   Non-farm business activity  	    
5.  Your own (singular) wage or salary employment  	    
6.  Major household expenditures (e.g.,   refrigerator, T.V.)  	    
7.  
Minor household expenditures (e.g., 
food for daily consumption or other 
household necessities)  	    
8.  Use of family planning products  	    
9.  Your health and nutrition  	    
10.  Children’s health care  	    
11.  Feeding children  	    
12.  How to keep yourself from domestic violence  	    
13.  To go to your mother's or friend's house  	    
 
Code list for 412.1  Code list for 412.2  Code list for 412.3,  
412.4 and 412.5 
01 = Self 
02 = Spouse 
03 = Self and spouse jointly 
04 = Other male household member 
05 = Other female household member 
06 = Self and other household member(s) 
07 = Spouse and other household  
        member(s) 
08 = Self, spouse and other household 
     ember(s) 
09 = Someone (or group of people)  
outside the household 
10 = Self and other outside people 
11 = Spouse and other outside people 
12 = Self, spouse and other outside  
        people 
95 = Decision not made 
 
01 = Not at all 
02 = To a small 
extent 
03 = To some extent 
04 = To a large  
extent 
 
01 = Strongly disagree  
02 = Disagree 
03 = Somewhat 
agree/disagree 
04 = Agree 
05 = Strongly agree 
